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I. Introduction 
Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 19971 
(“ASFA”) in response to growing concerns that state agencies were keeping 
children in foster care for too long and returning them to unsafe homes.2  
ASFA clarified, among other issues, that family reunification after a child's 
removal is favored.  To effectuate reunification, ASFA requires child 
protective service agencies to make reasonable efforts by providing services 
such as parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, or therapy for the 
family.3  However, ASFA also requires courts to consider the safety of the 
child as the paramount concern in all child welfare cases.4  As a result, 
under ASFA, reasonable efforts may not be required if there are 
“aggravated circumstances,” such as the parent subjecting the child to 
                                                                                                     
 1. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115. 
 2. Katherine S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA, 29 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 239 (2009) (citing The Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: 
Hearing on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 105th Cong. 48, 48-49 (1997). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010) (clarifying the Reasonable Efforts Requirement: 
“[R]easonable efforts shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a 
court of competent jurisdiction has determined that – 
(i) the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in 
State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, 
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse); 
(ii) the parent has – (I) committed murder . . . of another child of the parent; (II) 
committed voluntary manslaughter . . . of another child of the parent; (III) aided 
or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or (ii) 
such a voluntary manslaughter; (IV) committed a felony assault that results in 
serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent; or 
(iii) the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated 
involuntarily.”). 
 4. Id. 
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abandonment, torture, unexplained serious injuries, chronic abuse, or sexual 
abuse.5  States generally interpret this provision to mean that where there 
are aggravating circumstances,6 child protective service agencies may be 
excused from providing reunification services, but may also choose to make 
services available even when they are not required.7 Significantly, excusing 
the child protective services agency from providing reunification services to 
parents is often a substantial step toward terminating parental rights.8 
The discretion to deny reunification services has often led to 
inconsistencies in how and when courts order such services for parents.9  
Historically, cases of unexplained child abuse and neglect involving two 
parent caregivers have been extremely difficult to prosecute in both civil 
and criminal courts.  Because the child welfare system cannot always rely 
on the criminal justice system to protect children, it must rely on civil 
statutes to protect and address the needs of abused children and their 
families; however, current child welfare protections often do not extend far 
enough in cases where there are two caregivers with no plausible 
explanation for a child’s serious injury. 
This Article addresses how Delaware has adopted ASFA’s aggravated 
circumstances provisions, both statutorily and as applied by the Delaware 
Family Court. Delaware, like many other states, grapples with unexplained, 
serious child injuries. This Article will also address specific cases in 
Delaware that rose and fell on the basis of aggravated circumstances.  This 
Article places Delaware in the national context of statutory and judicial 
approaches to aggravated circumstances by suggesting a legislative path 
forward to provide even greater protections to children in the state. 
Part II of this Article will review two recent cases in Delaware and 
provide the historical context for aggravated circumstances in that state.  
Part III reviews the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) guidelines for 
child protection systems’ responsibilities as they relate to cases involving 
serious injuries.  Part IV reviews how the fifty states have responded 
                                                                                                     
 5. Id. 
 6. The federal statute uses the term “aggravated circumstances,” but states have 
variously adopted “aggravated” or “aggravating” circumstances in their statutes.  The 
alternate usage of “aggravated” or “aggravating” throughout this article mirrors those 
differences. 
 7. Bean, supra note 2, at 251. 
 8. See, e.g., In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 437 (Neb. 2003) (holding that clear 
and convincing evidence supported a finding that the mother subjected the child to 
aggravating circumstances, and thus reasonable efforts at reunification were not required). 
 9. We recognize inconsistencies will naturally exist because of factual differences, 
case complexity, and judicial discretion. 
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statutorily to ASFA’s aggravated circumstances clause. Part V will address 
how various jurisdictions handle serious injury cases. Finally, Part VI will 
propose strengthened protections in aggravated circumstance cases 
specifically to address the problem of children with unexplained injuries 
involving two parent caregivers. 
II. Delaware 
A. Recent Cases 
In Delaware, dependency and neglect cases involving two parent 
caregivers and a child with serious injuries may be problematic when those 
parent caregivers10 act as a united front to protect each other and the 
evidence cannot pinpoint who perpetrated the life-threatening injuries upon 
the child. Two recent serious injury cases are emblematic of the inherent 
complexity in Delaware’s current child welfare system.  This complexity 
manifests when two parent caregivers either present a united front of denial 
or are both the potential perpetrators of abuse. 
The first case involves baby Matt,11 who came into the foster care 
system at five months old with serious inflicted12 injuries.13 Matt was 
admitted to the emergency room with skull fractures, bruising on his leg, a 
bruised ear, and multiple fractures all over his body in various stages of 
healing.  The multiple injuries signified at least two, if not more, incidents 
of inflicted abuse.14 
Matt’s mother and stepfather were his primary caregivers. The 
maternal grandmother occasionally cared for him as well.  Both the mother 
and the stepfather were interviewed by the police and criminally 
investigated, but neither explained what, or who, caused the injuries.  The 
                                                                                                     
 10. The term “caregiver” refers to parents or others who live with the child and are 
actively caring for the child. 
 11. The child has been given a pseudonym to protect his identity. 
 12. “Inflicted injuries” is used to describe injuries that were caused by an actor, though 
that actor may not be identified. “Inflicted” is used rather than “non-accidental” because 
injuries could, theoretically, be both inflicted and accidental.  The determination of whether 
injuries are accidental or non-accidental has legal consequences.  Therefore, at the initial 
stages of a case, it may be more appropriate to refer to injuries caused by an unknown 
human actor as “inflicted.” “Inflicted injury” is also a medical opinion. 
 13. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., Del Fam. Ct., FN:12-02-10T (Jan. 8, 2013) 
(describing Matt’s injuries). 
 14. Id. 
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mother admitted that Matt suffered severe injuries while in her care, but did 
not explain or identify the source of those injuries.15  Nearly a year and a 
half after Matt came into foster care, the mother pled guilty to misdemeanor 
offensive touching stemming from some of Matt’s injuries, with a sentence 
of suspended Level V for 30 days and an order to enroll in an anger 
management program.16 
Although the Division of Family Services (“DFS”) requested to be 
excused from case planning on the grounds of serious unexplained injury,17 
the court felt legally bound to require DFS to case plan with the mother.18  
Under Delaware’s termination of parental rights serious injury statute, the 
court could not determine that Matt’s injuries “resulted from” the mother’s 
intentional conduct, reckless disregard, or willful neglect and therefore DFS 
was required to case plan with the mother.19  The court determined that her 
failure to seek medical attention did not rise to the statutory ground for 
aggravated circumstances.20  The stepfather was not a party to the civil 
action because he had no legal ties to the child.  Matt’s mother’s rights were 
eventually terminated for failure to plan.21  The natural father ultimately 
voluntarily consented to a termination.  Despite efforts by DFS to provide 
reunification services to the mother, she did not participate in any case 
planning and had no contact with Matt after he entered foster care.22 
Baby Jill23 was also five months old when she entered foster care after 
enduring twenty-seven fractures all over her body, including a broken 
clavicle and injuries to her extremities caused by yanking, squeezing, and 
shaking.24  Prior to entering care, Jill’s mother called the pediatrician to 
                                                                                                     
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(8) (2009).  DFS is excused from making reasonable 
efforts at reunification where “[a] child has suffered unexplained serious physical injury, 
near death, or death under such circumstances as would indicate that such injuries, near 
death or death resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct or wilful [sic] neglect of the 
parent.” 
 18. Matt’s mother did not complete any element on her case plan and never visited 
with Matt after his entry into the foster care system. 
 19. Div. of Family Servs v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 10, 2011). It is 
important to note that there were other complicating factors in this case, which led the Court 
to order DFS to case plan with the mother. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. The child has been given a pseudonym to protect her identity. 
 24. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No. 11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. 
Ct. 2012), aff’d Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. 2013, decided Dec. 
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report clicking and popping sounds in Jill’s chest when she breathed.  Jill’s 
mother had heard these clicking and popping sounds for about a week 
before her initial call to Jill’s pediatrician.  The pediatrician sent Jill to the 
hospital for suspected fractures and ordered x-rays.  Jill was sent home 
shortly thereafter.  Jill’s mother returned to the hospital the next morning 
because the clicking and popping sounds had not abated while awaiting the 
x-ray results.25  A pediatric child abuse expert examined Jill and determined 
that the injuries were in various stages of healing: some of the fractures had 
occurred within the previous five days and others were at least two to three 
weeks old.26 
Jill's mother and father were her primary caregivers.27  Neither parent 
reported any accidents or events that might have caused the clicking and 
popping sounds to occur.28  Neither parent provided a plausible explanation 
as to the cause of the injuries at any point during the criminal investigation 
or the dependency proceedings.29  Both parents admitted they were her 
primary caregivers and that only one other individual watched Jill alone for 
a few hours at least six weeks prior to Jill’s hospital admission, which did 
not align with the dates or ages of her injuries.30  Additionally, the father 
had a previous criminal charge of third-degree assault for abusing another 
of his children ten years prior when the child was three months old.  Not 
surprisingly, Jill did not incur any additional fractures after she was 
removed from her parents’ custody and placed in a foster home.31 
Unlike its decision in Matt’s case, soon after Jill came into foster care, 
the Family Court determined that the DFS decision to forgo case planning 
was neither arbitrary nor capricious.32  In a subsequent proceeding, the 
court terminated parental rights on the grounds of unexplained serious 
injury.33  Although the parents appealed, the Delaware Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
13, 2012). 
 25. A Delaware Child Abuse Neglect Panel reviewed pursuant to the Child Death, 
Near Death and Still Birth Commission. DEL. CODE tit. 31, § 302 (2011). 
 26. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No.11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
May 23, 2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No.11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
May 23, 2012). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Long v. Div. of Family Servs., No. 341 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012), appeal docketed, 
No. 341, 2012 (Del. 2012). 
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affirmed the decision.34  Still, without conclusive evidence, neither Jill’s 
mother nor father has been arrested or charged with abuse or neglect. 
Even before Matt and Jill’s cases, Delaware had a variable history of 
serious child injury cases, which shaped the Family Court’s consideration 
of such cases.  Before Delaware codified ASFA’s aggravated circumstances 
into its termination of parental rights statute, the Division of Family 
Services first sought permission to be excused from exerting reasonable 
efforts in 1999, involving a case where a child with a history of abuse came 
into state custody for a second time with bruises, a skull fracture, and 
subdural hematomas, which were likely the result of violent shaking.35  
Because of these grave injuries, the court excused DFS from case planning 
with the mother when she provided no plausible explanation.  The court 
concluded that the child’s health and safety would be placed in jeopardy if 
she were to return home.36 It further determined that “either Mother 
inflicted the abuse; Mother and someone else inflicted the abuse; or Mother 
knowingly failed to protect her child by allowing someone else to inflict 
abuse onto the child.”37  In 1997, 2000, and 2001, Delaware codified the 
federal ASFA requirements within its termination of parental rights statute 
and expanded aggravated circumstances to include abandonment, felony 
convictions where the victim is a child, prior involuntary terminations, 
torture, and chronic, life threatening and near death child abuse cases.38 
Since that time, when aggravated circumstances exist in a case, the 
Delaware Family Court proceedings have resulted in divergent outcomes. 
In a 2002 case, DFS case planned with the parents of a seven week-old 
child who came into care for significant, unexplained injuries while the 
father was the primary caregiver.  The parents had a significant history of 
domestic violence and substance abuse.  The court ultimately terminated 
the father’s parental rights because the father pled guilty to felony 
endangering the welfare of a child, and for unexplained injuries that 
resulted from the father’s intentional conduct or willful neglect.  Although 
the court terminated mother’s parental rights on failure to plan grounds, the 
court was unable to conclude that a finding of unexplained serious physical 
                                                                                                     
 34. Long v. Div. of Family Servs., 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012). 
 35. Div. of Family Servs v. J.K., 1999 WL 33208262 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1999) (holding 
that due to the mother’s minimal steps to protect the child and the mother’s disinterest in the 
child’s welfare, DFS did not have to undertake reasonable efforts before commencing 
termination proceedings with the mother).  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 5. 
 38. 73 Del. Laws 171 (2001). 
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injury resulted from mother’s intentional conduct or willful neglect because 
the mother was unaware of the father’s state of mind the night that the child 
sustained life threatening injuries.39 
In 2004, the Family Court found termination grounds as to both a 
mother and father for unexplained physical injuries when an infant 
miraculously survived after being thrown into a marsh.  In that case, the 
mother left her infant with the child’s father, who twenty-four hours prior 
had beaten and raped her.  The court was satisfied that grounds to terminate 
mother’s parental rights existed because, notwithstanding mother’s 
knowledge of the father’s violent behavior, she still left the infant in his 
care.40 
Yet, in 2006, the court declined to terminate the parental rights of a 
mother after her child entered foster care for severe unexplained injuries 
while in the father’s care. DFS sought a finding of aggravated 
circumstances because the mother delayed seeking medical treatment for 
the child. However, the court held that it could not conclusively find that 
the mother caused any of the child’s injuries, and that since the mother did 
not unreasonably delay in seeking medical treatment, her parental rights 
could not be terminated.41 
Then, in 2009, the court determined that aggravated circumstances 
were present when an infant came into care with serious, unexplained 
injuries from at least two incidents of abuse resulting in skull fractures. 
Although the parents were not criminally charged for their child’s injuries, 
the court conclusively determined that aggravated circumstances existed 
because the parents were the child’s primary caregivers and neither had an 
explanation as to how the child sustained such severe injuries.42  In that 
case, the child transitioned to a permanent guardianship arrangement with 
relatives.   
Many of the cases highlighted above, including Matt and Jill’s cases, 
demonstrate that not all incidents of child abuse are criminally prosecuted 
to the fullest extent possible because there often is a nonverbal child or 
                                                                                                     
 39. Div. of Family Servs. v. L.M., No. 01-06-09TN, 2002 WL 32101227, at 1, 11 
(Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002). 
 40. In re of J.G.W. III., No. 03-12-1TK, 2004 WL 3245804, at 1, 6 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
Nov. 10, 2004). 
 41. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.B., No. 04-10-03TN, 2006 WL 1389860, at 1, 17 (Del. 
Fam. Ct. Jan. 4, 2006). 
 42. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.W, No. CK08-01363 & CK08-01639, Nicholas, J. (Del. 
Fam. Ct. June 19, 2009). 
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insufficient evidence to implicate a perpetrator.43  As such, Delaware’s 
termination of parental rights statute has been amended to ensure the safety 
of children when parent caregivers cannot be criminally convicted of child 
abuse.  
“[I]n the American system of criminal justice, the offender is not 
always identified in a manner permitting a criminal prosecution.  In 
order to ensure that children are protected even when their abusers 
cannot be held criminally liable, Del. Code Tit. 13, section 1103 (a)(8) 
allows termination of parental rights of parents whose children sustain 
serious physical injuries “under such circumstances as would indicate 
that such injuries . . . resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct 
or willful neglect of the parent.”44 
Yet, in many serious child injury cases, the two parent caregivers 
prioritize their relationship over the child’s safety.45  One parent may inflict 
serious physical abuse while the other, either unwilling or unable to protect 
the child, stands by and continues to protect the abusive parent, or both 
parents jointly perpetrate the abuse.46  Instead of acting in the child’s best 
interest, which would include identifying the perpetrator to protect the child 
from future harm, two parent caregivers may present a united front of 
ignorance or denial regarding how a child sustains serious injuries.47  
Consequently, the child or children at issue in such cases may never truly 
be safe without either an acknowledgement of abuse by the caregivers or a 
corrective safety plan to protect the child because there is no way to remedy 
a grave danger to a child when no explanation exists as to what, or whom, 
that danger is.48 
The Delaware Family Court, like similar courts in other states, may 
struggle with such blanket denials by parents who assert a Fifth 
                                                                                                     
 43. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Working with the Courts in Child 
Protection 41 (2006), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals /courts/courts.pdf. 
 44. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012), aff’d, 
Long v. DFS, 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. 2013). 
 45. Numerous reasons exist as to why parents may prioritize their relationship over the 
child’s safety, including intimate partner violence, substance abuse, mental health or 
developmental disabilities.  See generally Diane J. English, The Extent and Consequences of 
Child Maltreatment, in 8 PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (1998). 
 46. See infra notes 204–205 and accompanying text. 
 47. See, e.g., Child Protection Inc., Oregon Safety Threats Guide, app. 2.4, 
http://www.dhs.state.or.us/caf/safety_model/procedure_manual/appendices/ch2-app/2-4.pdf. 
 48. Action for Child Protection, Inc., Unexplained Injuries, http://www.actionchild 
protection.org/ documents/2003/pdf/May2003UnexplainedInjuries2-27.pdf (May 2003) (on 
file with author). 
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Amendment right in conjunction with a pending, or anticipated, criminal 
trial related to their child’s injuries.  When parents fail to discuss or disclose 
their role in the abuse, it interferes with case planning for reunification, and 
parents may not be able to assert a Fifth Amendment right sufficient to 
trump their child’s best interests in a speedy and appropriate placement.49  
Nonetheless, where the circumstances compelling disclosure constitute a 
penalty situation, parents can prevail on their Fifth Amendment rights.50  
Courts can avoid reversal on Fifth Amendment grounds by structuring their 
opinions to reflect that the parent’s failure to disclose impeded the therapy 
or other services offered to the parent under their reunification plan, as 
without successful completion, there can be no reunification and 
termination is warranted.51  This fine line, however, as well as uncertainty 
as to the status of related criminal charges, may force courts to label certain 
injuries as “unexplained” when parents, invoking the Fifth Amendment, 
refuse to discuss what happened.52  As such, it should be kept in mind that 
“unexplained” may be more of a legal conclusion that no one perpetrator 
has been identified, rather than an accurate portrayal of the uncertainty of 
                                                                                                     
 49. In re A.C., 97 P.3d 960, 968 (Mont. 2001). See also In re P.M.C., 902 N.E.2d 197, 
203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding a fine but important distinction between terminating 
parental rights on refusal to admit to crime, and terminating parental rights based upon 
failure to comply with an order to undergo meaningful therapy where refusal to admit 
precludes rehabilitation); Robert S. v. Arizona Dep’t. of Econ. Sec., No. CA-JV-2010-0063, 
2010 WL 4296659, at 1-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2010) (affirming father’s termination of 
parental rights after he refused to participate in treatment under the assumption that he was a 
sex offender and finding no Fifth Amendment violation). 
 50. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 494, 496 (1967) (prohibiting courts from 
penalizing parties who choose not to testify or otherwise incriminate themselves). See also 
State v. Brown, 182 P.3d 1205, 1212-14 (Kan. 2008) (holding that where a parent is 
compelled to admit to criminal acts or face the loss of parental rights, the incriminating 
statement will be excluded from evidence once the parent becomes a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding); In re D.P., 763 N.E.2d 351, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that forcing a 
parent to choose between losing parental rights and waiving right to self-incrimination is 
unconstitutional).  
 51. People ex rel. E.W., 780 P.2d 32, 33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 52. Some courts resolve this problem by granting parents immunity for the statements. 
See, e.g., id. at 33 (holding that once father had been granted immunity and still failed to 
comply with his treatment plan, his Fifth Amendment privilege did not prevent termination 
of parental rights). Cf. In re Gladys H., 235 A.D.2d 841, 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (finding 
no error in placing father in dilemma of either testifying about the sexual abuse of his 
daughters and possibly facing later criminal charges or remaining silent in family court and 
risk that his parental rights be terminated); In re Samantha C., 847 A.3d 883, 907-08 (Conn. 
2004) (establishing based on the civil, remedial nature of the proceeding and the best 
interests of the child standard that the legislature did not intend to insulate parents from 
inferences drawn from their failure to testify at termination proceedings). 
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causation.  Because the criminal system does not always produce criminal 
charges or convictions for child abuse and neglect, the civil system often 
provides a more effective framework for ensuring the safety of children like 
Matt and Jill.  However, not all jurisdictions are equally equipped with the 
statutory tools to provide permanency expeditiously for children who 
cannot be reunited with their parents because of “unexplained” serious 
physical injuries. 
III.  State Adoption of Federal Guidelines 
Under ASFA, each state is free to define “aggravated 
circumstances.”53  ASFA suggests that aggravated circumstance may 
include, but need not be limited to: abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, 
and sexual abuse.54  Where there are aggravated circumstances, reasonable 
efforts toward reunification are not required.55 
A.  Aggravated Circumstances 
There is little consensus among states when incorporating “aggravated 
circumstances” into their reasonable efforts calculus. Eleven states use 
“aggravated circumstances” as an umbrella under which they enumerate all 
the circumstances where reasonable efforts are not required.  Ten states 
include the ASFA definition of aggravated circumstances, with its core four 
situations—abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse—
without further elaboration.  Four states include the core four situations as 
circumstances that excuse reasonable efforts, but do not use the term 
“aggravated circumstances.” Six states use the term “aggravated 
circumstances” but define the term vaguely or not at all.  Nine states 
incorporate “aggravated circumstances” into their statutes by including the 
core four situations and elaborating on other types of cases that are 
considered aggravated.  Finally, ten states neither use the term “aggravated 
circumstances” nor include a recognizable enumeration of the ASFA core 
four situations in their statutes.56 
                                                                                                     
 53. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010) (allowing the states to define aggravating 
circumstances as they see fit). 
 54. See id. (listing possible scenarios resulting in aggravated circumstances). 
 55. See id. (stating reasonable efforts towards reunification are not required when 
aggravating circumstances are present). 
 56. See supra notes 43–48. 
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Jurisprudence regarding aggravated circumstances also varies widely. 
Many states’ courts interpret ASFA such that even when reunification 
efforts are not required, they still may be permitted.  Rather than barring 
services, an aggravated circumstance instead excuses the requirement that 
services be provided and renders the decision discretionary.  Just over half 
of the states have no appellate-level jurisprudence specifically defining or 
elaborating upon what constitutes aggravated circumstances, especially in 
serious injury cases. Of the remaining twenty-three states, only six have 
significant jurisprudence on serious bodily injury and aggravated 
circumstances.  New Jersey has a judicial methodology for determining 
whether there are aggravating circumstances, and if so, whether to provide 
services.57  Nebraska has a contextual definition of aggravated 
circumstances, determined on a case-by-case basis.58  Michigan defines a 
cluster of circumstances, not listed in the statute, that provide a basis for 
finding aggravated circumstances.59  Arkansas defines both specific 
instances where aggravated circumstances can be found and a general 
character of aggravated circumstances.60  Oregon focuses on the elements 
of indirect causation that can still lead to a finding of aggravated 
circumstances.61  New York uses a community standard of heinousness to 
judge which cases are aggravated.62 
Currently, Delaware permits its Division of Family Services to be 
excused from case planning on the grounds of abandonment; certain felony 
offenses; prior involuntary termination; where a parent has subjected a child 
to torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and/or life-threatening abuse; and 
where a child has suffered unexplained serious physical injury, near death 
or death under such circumstances as would indicate that such injuries, near 
death or death resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct or “wilful” 
[sic] neglect of the parent.63  However, Delaware has several opportunities 
to strengthen DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(7)-(8) to further children’s best 
interests in cases where they have been seriously injured or subjected to 
aggravated circumstances while in the care of two parent caregivers acting 
as a united front. First, Delaware can amend the causation elements for 
                                                                                                     
 57. See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
 58. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. 
 59. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text. 
 60. See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text. 
 61. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 62. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 63. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103 (a)(2), (4), (6)–(8) (2009). 
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these termination grounds to streamline cases involving acts or omissions 
by two parent caregivers steadfast in their united front of denial or 
ignorance by defining the term “subjected to.” Second, Delaware can 
explicitly include “chronic neglect” as an excusing condition under the 
termination of parental rights statute. Third, Delaware can simplify its 
current termination of parental rights statute to incorporate all aggravated 
circumstances under one statutory ground. 
B.  Reasonable Efforts 
The term “reasonable efforts” refers to state social services agencies 
helping families to remain intact or reunify.64  While such services and their 
providers differ by state, these efforts may include family therapy, 
parenting classes, addiction treatment, respite care, and in-home services.65  
In addition to “aggravated circumstances,” ASFA provides that reasonable 
efforts are not required when a parent murders, commits voluntary 
manslaughter, aids, abets, attempts, conspires, or solicits such murder or 
manslaughter, or commits a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury 
to the child or another child of the parent, or the parent’s rights to a child’s 
sibling have been involuntarily terminated.66  Some states have additional 
statutory grounds excusing social services from making reasonable 
preservation or reunification efforts, such as a parent’s refusal or failure in 
treatment for chronic alcohol or drug abuse or failure to comply with the 
terms of a reunification plan.67  When reasonable efforts are required, the 
social service agency’s attempts to reunify may last upwards of fifteen 
months.  However, once the social service agency is absolved of making 
reasonable efforts to reunify a family in cases of serious injury or 
aggravated circumstances, the case may proceed in an expedited fashion to 
                                                                                                     
 64. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify 
Families and Achieve Permanency for Children: Summary of State Laws (Oct. 2012), 
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/reunify.cfm. 
 65. Id. at 1–2. 
 66. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (West 2010) (describing when reasonable efforts are not 
required under the ASFA). 
 67. See Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 65, at 3–4. Alabama, 
California, Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Puerto Rico list 
chronic abuse and refusal or failed treatment as excusing grounds.  Alaska, Florida, Kansas, 
Maine, Utah, Washington, and Puerto Rico consider failure to comply with a reunification 
plan’s terms as excusing grounds. 
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provide permanency for the child, including terminating parental rights to 
free the child for adoption.68 
IV.  State Statutes on Aggravated Circumstances 
Just as states have different kinds and numbers of additional excusing 
grounds, states also define “aggravated circumstances” differently.  Georgia 
uses the exact language of ASFA without elaboration, and most states 
include some version of the federal provision’s examples.69  Aggravated 
circumstances, textually or substantively, appear in state statutes excusing 
reasonable efforts in the following six ways: (1) as an umbrella 
encompassing all grounds for no reasonable efforts;70  (2) as one ground 
without definition beyond the four examples in ASFA;71  (3) as one ground 
mirroring ASFA but not expressly using the term “aggravated 
circumstances;”72  (4) as an undefined or vague term;73  (5) as an expansion 
on the ASFA core four of abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual 
abuse;74  and (6) not at all.75 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(E) (“[I]f 
reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph (B) are not made with respect to a 
child as a result of a determination made by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance 
with subparagraph (D) – (i) a permanency hearing . . . which considers in-State and out-of-
State placement options for the child, shall be held within 30 days after the determination; 
and (ii) reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance 
with the permanency plan, and to complete whatever steps are necessarily to finalize the 
permanent placement of the child; and (F) reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or 
with a legal guardian, including identifying appropriate in-State and out-of-State placements 
may be made concurrently with reasonable efforts of the type described in subparagraph 
(B) . . . .”). 
 69. See Bean, supra note 2, at 229 (listing the states that include some portion of the 
ASFA in their respective statutes). 
 70. Eleven states: Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. 
 71. Ten states: Georgia, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 72. Four states and the District of Columbia: Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, and South 
Dakota. 
 73. Six states: Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, and Oklahoma. 
 74. Nine states: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 75. Ten states: California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, Ohio, and Utah. 
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A.  The Umbrella 
Several states structure their statutes so that all grounds excusing 
reasonable efforts are included under the umbrella of “aggravated 
circumstances.” In such cases, the other ASFA provisions excusing 
reasonable efforts, such as parents’ murder convictions where the victim 
was one of their children, are included as well. This statutory structure is 
technically duplicative, since ASFA already provides that such 
circumstances are grounds to excuse reunification efforts. For example, 
Vermont defines aggravated circumstances to include situations where the 
parent has subjected a child to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or 
sexual abuse; has been convicted of murder or manslaughter of a child; has 
been convicted of a felony crime that results in serious bodily injury to the 
child or another child of the parent; and the parental rights with respect to a 
sibling have been terminated.76  Idaho’s statute is similarly duplicative; 
however, aggravated circumstances are not limited to those enumerated and 
serious bodily injury to a child is also included.77 
Other states include grounds not mentioned in ASFA under 
“aggravated circumstances.”  Hawaii requires no service plan if the court 
finds that there are aggravated circumstances, which are then defined to 
include six circumstances, none of which exactly mirror ASFA’s core 
four.78  Iowa similarly includes all grounds for waiving reasonable efforts 
under the umbrella of aggravated circumstances.79  Pennsylvania uses 
                                                                                                     
 76. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5102 (West 2010). 
 77. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16–1619(6)(d) (West 2010) (stating that aggravated 
circumstances include, but are not limited to: abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual 
abuse; the parent committed murder or voluntary manslaughter or aided, abetted, attempted, 
conspired, or solicited such crimes against another child; the parent committed a battery 
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child; and prior involuntary termination of parental 
rights to a sibling. 
 78. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 587A–2, 587A–71 (West 2012). Two of the six 
circumstances include child torture and infant abandonment. Three are grounds separate 
from aggravated circumstances, but also found in ASFA, including murder or voluntary 
manslaughter of another child of the parent, felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury 
to the child or another child of the parent, and previous judicial termination of parental rights 
to the child’s sibling. The sixth circumstance is a prior court determination as to a sibling 
that “the parent is not willing and able to provide a safe family home.” 
 79. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.102 (West 2012).  Two of the five are akin to ASFA – the 
parent has abandoned the child or the court finds physical or sexual abuse or neglect. Two 
mirror the other ASFA grounds, including murder or voluntary manslaughter and felony 
assault. The fifth is conjunctive and requires both a prior termination of parental rights as 
well as clear and convincing evidence that services are unlikely within a reasonable time to 
correct the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the home. 
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aggravated circumstances as one part of a two-part conjunctive 
determination: there must be both aggravated circumstances and no new or 
additional efforts are required.80  Pennsylvania’s grounds include the ASFA 
list of crimes, prior involuntary termination, abandonment, and that the 
child or another child of the parent “has been the victim of serious physical 
abuse, sexual violence, or aggravated physical neglect by the parent.”81 
State statutes using the umbrella structure do not always mirror ASFA. 
Washington uses the umbrella structure more restrictively: four of the seven 
provisions require criminal convictions for violent or sexual offenses, while 
the other three are abandonment of an infant less than three years old, a 
finding by a court that a parent is a sexually violent predator, and failure to 
complete a treatment plan resulting in a prior parental rights termination 
with no significant changes in the interim.82  By contrast, Texas uses the 
umbrella structure, but its description of “aggravated circumstances” is 
quite expansive.83  Texas includes two forms of abandonment, serious 
bodily injury or sexual abuse, both commission or conviction of murder or 
manslaughter, a variety of sex crimes and child pornography offenses, a 
prior termination of parental rights with a finding of child endangerment, 
prior termination of parental rights to two other children (without any 
stipulation of a certain finding), and felony assault.84  Arizona similarly 
uses “aggravated circumstances” as an umbrella, but deviates from ASFA 
both in structure and content.85 
Other states use aggravated circumstances as an umbrella for most, but 
not all, of the circumstances excusing reasonable efforts. Maine does not 
require reunification efforts where there is an aggravating factor or where 
                                                                                                     
 80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6351, 6302 (West 2012). 
 81. Id. 
 82. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.132 (West 2012). 
 83. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.2015 (West 2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8–846 (West 2012).  Aggravated circumstances, which 
must be found by clear and convincing evidence, exist where: the parent cannot be identified 
or located, or suffers from a mental illness that will likely prevent him or her from resuming 
the child’s care within twelve months; the parent has a prior termination of parental rights 
and the conditions leading to the termination were not remedied; parent was convicted of 
murder, manslaughter, sexual abuse, sexual assault, molestation, or sexual exploitation of a 
child, or aiding or abetting such crimes; the child was previously adjudicated dependent due 
to physical or sexual abuse, returned to the parent, and then removed within eighteen months 
due to additional physical or sexual abuse; the child has suffered severe physical or 
emotional injury by the parent or a person known to the parent; or the child was removed 
from the parent on at least two previous occasions, reunification services were offered or 
provided, and the parent is unable to discharge parental duties. 
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continuing reunification efforts is inconsistent with the child’s permanency 
plan, and either condition is sufficient by itself to excuse reasonable 
efforts.86  Under the Maine framework, aggravated circumstances are then 
used as an umbrella for five separate circumstances regarding the parent, 
including the ASFA provisions, failure to plan, and subjecting a child to 
“any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.”87  New 
Mexico uses a similar disjunctive structure, not requiring reasonable efforts 
where “[t]he efforts would be futile” or where there are aggravated 
circumstances, and then continuing to define aggravated circumstances in 
keeping with ASFA.88  North Dakota also uses a disjunctive structure, but 
the two independently sufficient excusing prongs are aggravated 
circumstances and prior involuntary termination of parental rights.89  North 
Dakota’s statute is more similar to the other umbrella statutes in Hawaii, 
Iowa, and Pennsylvania than it is to the disjunctive statutes in Maine or 
New Mexico.  North Dakota also defines aggravated circumstances quite 
broadly beyond ASFA, much like Texas.90 
                                                                                                     
 86. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4041(A–2), 4002(1–B) (West 2011). 
 87. Id. The first aggravated circumstance is that the parent “has subjected a child for 
whom the parent was responsible to rape, gross sexual misconduct, gross sexual assault, 
sexual abuse, incest, aggravated assault, kidnapping, promotion of prostitution, 
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse or any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to 
society.” 
 88. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A–4–2, 32A–4–22 (West 2012). New Mexico defines 
aggravated circumstances as attempting to, conspiring to, or causing great bodily harm or 
death to the child, the child’s sibling, or the child’s parent; attempting to, conspiring to, or 
subjecting the child to torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse; and prior involuntary 
termination of parental rights to a sibling. 
 89. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 27–20–02, 27–20–32.2 (West 2011). 
 90. Id.  Aggravated circumstances are present where a parent: abandons, tortures, 
chronically abuses, or sexually abuses a child; fails to make substantial efforts to secure 
treatment for an addiction, mental illness, or other condition for one year or one-half of the 
child’s lifetime, whichever time period is less; engages in deviant sexual acts, sexual abuse, 
etc. in which the victim is a child; commits murder, manslaughter, or negligently causes the 
death of another, or attempts such crimes, where the victim is another child of the parent; 
commits aggravated assault in which the victim is a child of the parent and suffers serious 
bodily injury; commits assault, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment or terrorizing in 
which a child is the victim or intended victim; or has been incarcerated under a sentence for 
which the release date is after the child’s majority when the child is nine years old or older 
or after the child is twice the child’s current age where the child is younger than nine years 
old. 
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B.  ASFA-Only: The Core Four 
Seven states use the term “aggravated circumstances” or “aggravating 
circumstances” to mean the four core enumerated circumstances in ASFA: 
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse.91  Georgia,92  
Mississippi,93  Nebraska,94  North Carolina,95  Rhode Island,96  West 
Virginia,97  and Wisconsin98  describe these four circumstances as non-
exhaustive situations included in the definition, mirroring the ASFA 
provision that aggravated circumstances are to be defined by the states and 
may include but are not limited to those four situations.99 
Three other states—Montana,100 South Carolina,101 and New 
Jersey102—have either minor additions to or use variations of the ASFA 
core four, but are otherwise limited in their definitions. 
                                                                                                     
 91. See supra note 5. Aggravated circumstances may include but are not limited to the 
core four of abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and/or sexual abuse. 
 92. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-58 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances “may 
include” the enumerated core four. 
 93. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 43-21-603(7) (West 2011).  Aggravated circumstances 
include but are not limited to the core four. 
 94. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-283.201 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances 
“include” the core four. 
 95. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7B-1111, 7B-507 (West 2012). Aggravated 
circumstances “include” the core four. 
 96. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-12.2 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances 
include the core four. 
 97. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances “include, but 
are not limited to” the core four. 
 98. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.355 (West 2012). Aggravated circumstances include the 
core four. 
 99. See supra note 6. 
 100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-423 (West 2011). While Montana also includes 
“chronic, severe neglect” alongside the core four, this addition is more the like variation seen 
infra note 59, than the elaborations in subgroup (E), and so is included in subgroup (B). 
 101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1640 (West 2011). Aggravated circumstances include 
sexual abuse, torture, or abandonment, as well as “severe or repeated abuse or neglect.” 
While this does not mirror the exact ASFA language of “chronic abuse,” it is substantially 
similar to be included in this list, especially given Bean’s analysis that “chronic abuse,” as 
used to refer to aggravated circumstances, can include abuse that immediately or irreparably 
inflicts very serious harm or abuse that is repeated, continuing, intractable, or resistant to 
change.  See also Bean, supra note 2, at 265-66. 
 102. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-11.2, 30:4C-11.3 (West 2012). Reasonable efforts are 
not required when the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse, 
neglect, cruelty, or abandonment.  This list appears to be limited to just these four situations, 
and “torture” has been replaced with “cruelty.”  The absence of the intensifier “chronic” may 
not necessarily influence judicial interpretation of the provision, as “aggravated 
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C. ASFA by Any Other Name 
Four states and the District of Columbia list the core four of 
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse, or a cluster of 
situations substantially similar to the core four, as conditions excusing 
reasonable efforts, but do not use the term “aggravated circumstances” in 
the statute.  Delaware lists torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and/or life-
threatening abuse together, while abandonment appears earlier in the 
statute.  The District of Columbia lists the core four and adds cruelty to the 
same provision.103  Maryland includes chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and 
torture, and while abandonment is not explicitly mentioned, “chronic and 
life-threatening neglect” is included.104  South Dakota includes torture, 
sexual abuse, abandonment, and chronic neglect or physical, mental, or 
emotional injury.105  Alaska includes abandonment, sexual abuse, torture, 
chronic mental injury, and chronic physical harm as examples of 
“circumstances that pose a substantial risk of harm.”106 
D.  Undefined, Redirected, or Vague 
A few states, conversely to those states in Part IV (C), include the term 
“aggravated circumstances” but do not define it in the statute.  
Connecticut107 and Kansas108 both excuse reasonable efforts where the 
parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, without further 
elaboration as to what that term means.  New York109 and Oklahoma110 
                                                                                                     
circumstances of” suggests that it is particularly severe or egregious instances of those 
situations that the statute is addressing. 
 103. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1301.09a (West 2012). 
 104. M.D. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-812(b) (West 2012). Chronic neglect and 
abandonment appear to be different situations based on other statutory constructions, and 
abandonment, as defined in other statutes, is not per se life-threatening neglect. Still, the 
substantial similarity between the Maryland statute and the ASFA core four warrants 
inclusion in this grouping. 
 105. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.1 (West 2012). Chronic neglect or chronic 
physical, mental, or emotional injury may be reasonably construed to include, more or less, 
chronic abuse as contemplated in other jurisdictions. 
 106. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.086 (West 2012). 
 107. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-111b (West 2012). Reasonable efforts not required 
if the parent “has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances.” 
 108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2255 (West 2012). The Kansas statute also includes 
subjecting “another child to aggravated circumstances.” 
 109. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 358-a, 384-b (West 2012).  Reasonable efforts are not 
required when the court determines that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated 
circumstances, where the child has been either severely or repeatedly abused. 
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have relatively vague definitions of aggravated circumstances, though they 
might be interpreted as covering the substantive portions of the ASFA core 
four. 
Colorado does not require reasonable efforts where “the parent has 
subjected the child to aggravated circumstances to such an extent that 
grounds exist for termination of the parent’s parental rights” as outlined in 
another statute.111  While Louisiana does not include the term “aggravated 
circumstances” in its statute, it otherwise closely resembles the Colorado 
statute as reunification efforts are not required where the “parent has 
subjected the child to egregious conduct or conditions, including any of the 
grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to Article 1015.”112 
                                                                                                     
 110. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-809 (West 2012).  Aggravated circumstances 
include but are not limited to heinous and shocking abuse or neglect. 
 111. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-115 (West 2012).  The statute directs the reader to 
§ 19-3-604(1) for a description of those grounds, which are extensive. Among the many 
grounds are “an identifiable pattern of sexual abuse” and “torture of or extreme cruelty to the 
child.”  To the extent that abandonment or chronic abuse are implicated, they are in 
conjunction with other findings of the court, criminal convictions, certain lengths of time, or 
resulting serious bodily injury or death. As a result of these substantial variations and 
limitations on the ASFA core four, as well as the redirection to another statute specifically in 
reference to grounds for termination of parental rights, not just excusing reasonable efforts, 
Colorado is included in subgroup (D) and not (E). 
 112. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 672.1 (2012).  Like the Colorado statute, the Louisiana 
statute redirects the reader to the termination of parental rights statute to elaborate on the 
excusing grounds.  This structural similarity to Colorado’s statute suggests that for analytic 
purposes, the Louisiana statute should be listed in subgroup (D), not cluster (C) with the 
other statutes that do not use the term “aggravating circumstances” explicitly. Furthermore, 
Article 1015, like Colorado’s § 19-3-604(1), includes a scattershot of terms akin to the 
ASFA core four but insufficiently similar for inclusion in subgroup (E) and insufficiently 
distinguishable for inclusion in another subgroup.  For example, Art. 1015 includes 
misconduct of the parent toward the child or another child which constitutes “extreme abuse, 
cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of 
human decency, including but not limited to the conviction, commission, aiding or abetting, 
attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit” twelve enumerated crimes, including 
aggravated incest, rape, sodomy, torture, starvation, a felony resulting in serious bodily 
injury, sexual abuse, and abuse or neglect which is “chronic, life threatening, or results in 
grave disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement.” Louisiana continues to 
improve its child welfare laws.  As of June 11, 2012, reunification efforts are no longer 
required where a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the parent has committed 
murder or manslaughter of another child of the parent or any other child or committed a 
felony resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent or any 
other child (emphasis added to reflect changes).  2012 LA. SESS. LAW. SERV. ACT 730 (S.B. 
152) (West). 
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E.  ASFA-Plus: Beyond the Core Four 
Multiple states define “aggravated circumstances” as suggested in 
ASFA. Their definitions may include but are not limited to abandonment, 
torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse, and the overall statutory structure 
generally treats the aggravated circumstances as separate from the other 
ASFA excusing conditions.113 
Alabama uses this structure particularly well. In addition to the ASFA 
core four, the statute lists ten other circumstances included in the 
definition.114  Arkansas similarly defines aggravated circumstances to 
include three of the core four expressly, torture implicitly, and two 
additional circumstances.115  Kentucky does not include the core four 
expressly, but does list five separate circumstances that are aggravated.116  
Michigan,117 Oregon,118 and Tennessee119 also take the enumerated 
                                                                                                     
 113. See supra note 6. 
 114. ALA. CODE § 12-15-312(c) (West 2012).  An aggravated circumstance may include 
but is not limited to: rape, sodomy, incest, aggravated stalking, abandonment, torture, 
chronic abuse, or sexual abuse.  An aggravated circumstance may also include: allowing a 
child to use alcohol or illegal drugs to the point of abuse, neglect, or substantial risk of harm; 
parental misuse or abuse of substances interfering with the ability to keep the child safe, and 
parental refusal to participate in or complete treatment or treatment has been unsuccessful; a 
demonstration of extreme disinterest in the child by not complying with the case plan for six 
months or repeatedly leaving the child with someone unwilling or incapable of caring for the 
child and not returning for the child as promised; an infant or young child has been 
abandoned, identity unknown, and parent is unknown or unable to be found after a diligent 
search; parent has emotional or mental condition for which there is clearly no treatment that 
can improve or strengthen the condition enough to allow the child to remain at home or 
return home safely; and/or the parent is incarcerated and the child is deprived of a safe, 
stable, and permanent parent-child relationship. 
 115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303 (West 2012).  Aggravated circumstances may include 
that a child “has been abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated 
cruelty, or sexually abused,” or a judge determines that there is little likelihood that services 
to the family will result in successful reunification.  Also included is removal of the child 
from the parent or guardian’s custody and placement in foster care or custody of another 
person three or more times in the past fifteen months. 
 116. K.Y. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 610.127, 600.020 (West 2012). Aggravated 
circumstances include: no parental contact with the child for more than ninety days; parent is 
incarcerated for at least one year, parent will be unavailable to care for child, and there is no 
appropriate relative to care for the child; the parent has sexually abused the child and refused 
available treatment; the parent has engaged in abuse of the child that required removal two 
or more times in the last two years; and the parent has caused the child serious physical 
injury.  The statute lists five other provisions that excuse reasonable efforts, but they are not 
included under aggravating circumstances. 
 117. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 712A.19a, 722.638 (2012).  Aggravated circumstances 
include abandoning a young child; criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted 
penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate; battering, torture, or other severe physical 
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expansion approach, mostly covering the ASFA core four along with other 
circumstances. 
Massachusetts defines aggravated circumstances as a relatively limited 
variation on the ASFA core four,120 while Virginia expands on the ASFA 
core four to include omissions enabling such conduct and resulting injury or 
death of the child.121  Although Wyoming only includes one additional 
provision defining aggravated circumstances beyond the ASFA core four, 
the language is broad enough to encompass a variety of qualifying 
situations.122 
F.  Missing in Action 
Multiple states neither include the term “aggravated circumstances” 
nor a readily identifiable recitation of the ASFA core four of abandonment, 
torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse.  Missouri, on the briefer end of the 
spectrum, lists only four excusing conditions, one of which is subjecting 
“the child to severe or recurrent acts of physical, emotional, or sexual 
                                                                                                     
abuse; loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb; or life-threatening injury. 
 118. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.340 (West 2012).  Aggravated circumstances include 
but are not limited to:  causing a child’s death by abuse or neglect; attempting, soliciting, or 
conspiring to cause a child’s death; causing serious physical injury to a child by abuse or 
neglect; subjecting a child to rape, sodomy, or sexual abuse; subjecting a child to intentional 
starvation or torture; abandoning the child; and unlawfully causing the death of the child’s 
other parent. 
 119. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-102(9), 37-1-166 (West 2012).  Aggravated 
circumstances include: abandonment; aggravated assault; aggravated or especially 
aggravated kidnapping; aggravated child abuse and neglect; aggravated or especially 
aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor; aggravated rape, rape of a child, or incest; and 
severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102. 
 120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29C (West 2012).  Aggravated circumstances 
may include murdering the child’s parent while the child is present, subjecting the child or 
other children to sexual abuse or exploitation, or severe or repetitive conduct of physically or 
emotionally abusive nature. 
 121. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-281 (West 2012).  Aggravated circumstances include 
torture, chronic or severe abuse, or chronic and severe sexual abuse, if the victim was the 
parent’s child or a child residing with the parent.  They also include failure to protect the 
child from such conduct, if the conduct or failure to protect demonstrates a wanton or 
depraved indifference to human life, or has resulted in the death of the child or in serious 
bodily injury to the child. 
 122. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c) (West 2012).  Excusing provisions include 
abandonment, chronic abuse, torture, or sexual abuse of the child, as well as “other 
aggravating circumstances . . . . indicating that there is little likelihood that services will 
result in successful reunification.” 
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abuse, including an act of incest.”123  More exhaustively, California lists 
thirteen separate findings excusing reasonable efforts, but the core four are 
either absent or paired with other conditions or results before they are 
sufficient grounds to excuse reasonable efforts.124  Florida has eight 
excusing provisions, and like California, they only implicate the ASFA core 
four in connection with other terms and conditions.125  Minnesota includes 
subjecting the child to “egregious harm” or abandonment as two of the 
seven excusing conditions.126  Nevada describes three different forms of 
abandonment as excusing conditions and includes where a “parent has 
caused the abuse or neglect of the child or another child that resulted in 
substantial bodily harm or was so extreme or repetitious as to result in an 
unacceptable risk to the health and welfare of the child.”127  Utah prefaces 
its statute that in “cases of obvious sexual abuse, abandonment, or serious 
physical abuse or neglect,” there is no duty to make reasonable efforts.128  
Utah further includes, among other very specific and more unusual 
provisions, that “severe abuse by the parent or by any person known by the 
                                                                                                     
 123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2012). The three remaining provisions are 
involuntary termination of parental rights as to a sibling, commission of felony assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child, and commission of murder or 
voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent. 
 124. CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2012).  For example, infliction of 
“severe physical or sexual abuse on the child or a sibling” is included, but the court must 
also find “that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification with the offending 
parent” for reasonable efforts to be excused. Similarly, abandoning a child is not a provision, 
but “willfully” abandoning a child is. 
 125. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.521(1)(f), 39.806(1) (West 2012). Abandonment is only an 
excusing condition where the child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been 
filed with the court, and the child continues to be abandoned by the parents.  Sexual abuse 
and chronic abuse appear alongside aggravated child abuse and sexual battery of the child or 
another child.  Torture is not specifically mentioned, though one provision includes the 
parent(s) engaging in “egregious conduct or [having] the opportunity and capability to 
prevent and knowingly [failing] to prevent egregious conduct that threatened the life, safety, 
or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling.” 
 126. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012 (West 2012).  Minnesota’s five other excusing 
conditions include involuntary termination of parental rights, involuntary transfer of 
custodial rights to another relative, a determination “that additional reasonable efforts would 
be futile and unreasonable under the circumstances,” or criminal convictions for various 
violent or assaultive crimes against the child or another child. 
 127. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.393 (West 2011). The abandonment situations 
include sixty days of abandonment or failure to make more than token contact for six 
months; the failure of an unmarried father to visit the child, commence proceedings to 
establish paternity, or provide support in the first year of the child’s life; and the delivery of 
a child less than one year old to a provider of emergency services. 
 128. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-312 (West 2012). 
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parent, and the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the 
person was abusing the child” will also excuse.129 Illinois,130 Indiana,131 
New Hampshire,132 and Ohio133 drift even further away from ASFA, as 
most if not all of the excusing conditions require criminal convictions 
before reunification services can end. 
V. Case Law Grappling with Statutory Construction 
The structural and substantive differences among state statutes do not 
necessarily correlate with a particular kind of state jurisprudence regarding 
when reasonable efforts are excused because there are aggravating 
circumstances.  Oregon, with its relatively broad statute, has invited judicial 
interpretation that aggravated circumstances are “those involving relatively 
more serious types of harm or detriment to a child” and include both 
parents’ conduct and the “results of those actions and conditions, including 
effects, direct and indirect, on [the] child.”134  Despite New Jersey’s 
relatively terse statutory definition of aggravated circumstances, its courts 
                                                                                                     
 129. Id.  One example of the specific and unusual inclusions stated that the “parent 
permitted the child to reside, permanently or temporarily, where the parent knew or should 
have known that a clandestine laboratory operation was located.” 
 130. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/5 (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-
13.1 (West 2012).  The parent must have been convicted of aggravated battery, aggravated 
battery of a child, or felony domestic battery, “any one of which has resulted in serious 
bodily injury to the minor or another child of the parent.” 
 131. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-21-5.6 (West 2012).  The parent must have been 
convicted of causing a suicide, involuntary manslaughter, rape, criminally deviant conduct, 
child molestation, or exploitation of a victim who is the parent’s child or the child’s other 
parent, or convicted of battery, aggravated battery, criminal recklessness, or neglect against a 
child.  Abandonment is also mentioned. 
 132. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:24-a (West 2012).  There are six provisions, four 
of which are convictions for various violent or assaultive crimes against the child, the child’s 
siblings, or other family members in the home.  The remaining two are court determinations 
of abandonment and out-of-home placement for twelve of the most recent twenty-two 
months where the placement was due to a finding of child neglect or abuse. 
 133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.419 (West 2011). There are seven excusing 
conditions.  The parent must have been convicted of assault, endangering children, rape, 
sexual battery, corruption of a minor, or sexual imposition of the child or another child in the 
household. Two require convictions for murder or voluntary manslaughter or conspiracy, 
attempt, or complicity in those substantive crimes. Two are prior involuntary parental rights 
termination and abandonment.  The final two are somewhat unusual in their specificity.  The 
parent must have “repeatedly withheld medical treatment or food from the child” or “placed 
the child at substantial risk of harm two or more times due to drug or alcohol abuse and have 
rejected treatment two or more times.” 
 134. Bean, supra note 2, at 705. 
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have defined “aggravating circumstances”135 and developed a methodology 
to determine whether they excuse reasonable efforts.136  Additionally, 
ASFA gives state courts discretion in individual cases, 137 and courts appear 
willing to exercise that discretion while adjudicating when reasonable 
efforts are not required.138  Perhaps because of this state-by-state discretion, 
similarities among states sharing common statutory structures are not 
necessarily robust. 
A.  The Umbrella 
Of the eleven states with an umbrella-type structure, four do not have 
appellate jurisprudence on the meaning of aggravated circumstances.139  
The remaining seven states only have one or two cases on point.140  While 
the Supreme Court of Idaho held that abuse includes where a child is a 
                                                                                                     
 135. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 824 A.2d 213, 233–34 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (stating that aggravating circumstances embody “the 
concept that the nature of the abuse or neglect must have been so severe or repetitive that to 
attempt reunification would jeopardize … the safety of the child, and would place the child 
in a position of an unreasonable risk to be [re-abused].  Moreover, any circumstances that 
increase the severity of the abuse or neglect or add to its injurious consequences, equates to 
‘aggravated circumstances.’”). 
 136. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 179 N.J. 264, 283-84 
(2004) (discussing “aggravated circumstances”). 
 137. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 678 (West 2012) (“Rule of Construction.  Nothing in this part 
shall be construed as precluding State courts from exercising their discretion to protect the 
health and safety of children in individual cases, including cases other than those described 
in § 471(a)(15)(D).”). 
 138. See In re Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 372 (2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1059 
(2003) (finding no error in terminating parental rights without first making reasonable efforts 
to reunify family, as reasonable efforts would only be required if in the best interests of the 
children and not contrary to their health and safety);  J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 389 (Alaska 
2002) (finding that where there had been devastating sexual abuse, the fundamental right of 
a child to safety was not trumped by a person’s fundamental right to parent);  In re C.B., 611 
N.W.2d 489, 489 (Iowa 2000) (interpreting ASFA as eliminating the reasonable efforts 
requirement for certain types of parental behavior); People ex rel. J.S.B., Jr., 691 N.W.2d 
611, 617 (S.D. 2004) (interpreting ASFA to tip the balancing formula for reunification of 
parents with children in favor of protecting children and not on the side of protecting 
parents’ rights, where they conflict); Guardian Ad Litem Program v. T.R., 987 So. 2d 1269, 
1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (excusing case planning where parents committed egregious 
conduct). 
 139. Arizona’s appellate record does not flesh out the definition of aggravating 
circumstances, and those cases that might be on point are designated without legal precedent 
and are not to be cited.  Hawaii and Vermont do not have much jurisprudence at the 
appellate levels on this topic at all.  Texas has an appellate record, but none of the cases deal 
directly with defining aggravated circumstances.   
 140. Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  
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victim of failure to thrive under its Child Protective Act and that long-term 
food deprivation constitutes chronic abuse, other states trend toward 
explaining the types of treatment that constitute aggravated circumstances, 
not delineating specific circumstances that qualify.141  For example, the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota found that one child’s “shaken baby 
syndrome” (now more appropriately referred to as “abusive head trauma”) 
was sufficiently aggravating to warrant taking all the siblings into custody, 
including a baby born after the incident.142  The court also articulated that a 
parent’s failure to cooperate with social services indicates that the causes 
and conditions of the children’s removal are likely to continue or will not 
be remedied, and that for children with special needs, parents are given less 
leeway to meet the minimum community standards of parenting.143  The 
appellate court of New Mexico has taken notice of its statute’s redundancy 
regarding prior termination of parental rights to a sibling: such a prior 
termination bypasses the reasonable efforts requirement either in its own 
right or as an aggravating circumstance.144  Just as New Mexico’s 
consideration of its aggravated circumstances statute has been limited, 
Pennsylvania’s has also been brief.  The court has spoken only to reverse a 
lower court’s incorrect retroactive application of the aggravated 
circumstances amendments to a case from 1998.145 
Among the umbrella states, Maine stands apart in its thorough 
explanation of the use of the word “subjected” in terms of aggravated 
circumstances.  The Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute’s plain 
                                                                                                     
 141. See Doe v. State, 144 Idaho 420, 420 (2007) (affirming the father’s termination of 
parental rights. . . . [F]ather had subjected…children to excessive corporal punishment, 
denied them food, access to the bathroom, and medical care.  A pediatrician found it would 
take five months of consistent food deprivation to reach that child’s emaciated condition).  
 142. See In re K.B., 801 N.W.2d 416, 425 (N.D. 2011) (holding that there was not a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made). 
 143. See id at 421. 
 144. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 850 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the redundancy does not affect the outcome of the case 
and defends the use of a prior termination as a trigger for excusing reasonable efforts.  The 
court opines that where the State has a substantial interest in protecting children and the 
government has a legitimate interest in making the best use of limited resources, a 
Legislature’s determination that a prior termination is a factor to consider is both 
“reasonable and legitimate”). 
 145. See In re R.T., 778 A.2d 670, 673 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding that the 
retroactive application of aggravated circumstances deprived a parent of his vested right to 
parent his children and be given a plan for their return since a prior termination of parental 
rights was given a different legal effect from that which it had under the law in effect when it 
transpired). 
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language did not limit its reach only to affirmative or criminal acts, as 
“subjected to” includes mere exposure to the circumstances meeting the 
requirements for aggravated circumstances.146  Importantly, the court also 
noted that the statute anticipates that certain acts, even when they do not 
result in criminal prosecutions, can meet the definition for aggravated 
circumstances: parental behavior need only fall far outside the norm of 
ordinary, fallible parental behavior, not necessarily into criminally culpable 
conduct.147 
This broad-sweeping use of the umbrella structure and “subjected to” 
language contrasts sharply with the limited holdings in the appellate courts 
of Iowa and Washington.  An Iowa appellate court held recently that three 
older children’s mere presence in the home while one sibling drowned and 
another was tortured did not support a threshold finding supporting the 
waiver of reasonable reunification efforts because it was not clear and 
convincing evidence of aggravated circumstances under the statute.148  In a 
similar statutory bind, an appellate court in Washington found that the trial 
court erred in using the aggravated circumstances statute to excuse 
reasonable efforts because the parent had not raped the child in the instant 
proceeding, but rather had raped the child’s older sister.149  Despite this 
error, the termination of parental rights was upheld on other grounds.150  
Courts in states with umbrella-type statutes appear to rely more heavily on 
specific provisions, such as abuse of other siblings or criminal charges, 
                                                                                                     
 146. See In re Ashley S., 762 A.2d 941, 947 (Me. 2000) (finding in a case where a two-
year-old girl was removed from a home with shockingly dangerous and unsanitary 
conditions after the death of her two-month-old brother that the father’s failure to even 
notice his son’s death for most of a day was clear and convincing evidence of deprivation of 
supervision). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See In re T.H. Jr., 801 N.W.2d 34 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished table 
opinion) (revealing that the children’s guardian ad litem recommended the father’s rights be 
terminated, and there was no reasonable belief that the conditions leading to the abuse or 
neglect could be remedied through services in a reasonable amount of time, but that 
nevertheless the court reversed the termination of parental rights and waiver of reasonable 
efforts as to the three older children who had witnessed the death of one younger sibling and 
torture of another). 
 149. See In re Termination of C.L., 126 P.3d 1285, 1286 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that because subject child was not victim of child rape, father’s conviction was not 
an aggravating circumstance). 
 150. See id. at 1287 (concluding that services would not have remedied the parental 
deficiencies in the foreseeable future because the child was within eighteen months of 
turning eighteen years old, the father was prohibited from having any contact with underage 
females, and the father was not considered amenable to treatment). 
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rather than “aggravated circumstances” as a broad class of egregious 
circumstances. 
B.  ASFA-Only: The Core Four 
ASFA-only states, where there is appellate jurisprudence on 
aggravated circumstances appear to construe the term more broadly to offer 
more protection to children in unenumerated but egregious circumstances. 
Of the ten states defining aggravated circumstances within the limits of the 
federal statutory examples, five do not have appellate cases addressing 
further explications of aggravated circumstances.151  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey developed a four-prong test to determine whether or not 
aggravated circumstances excusing reasonable reunification efforts exist.152  
In A.R.G., the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered separate lines of 
inquiry to determine aggravated circumstances: (1) Did the alleged conduct 
take place?  If not, family reunification efforts are required.153  If yes, (2) 
was the conduct severe or repetitive?  If yes, the court must determine (3) 
whether reunification would jeopardize and compromise the child’s safety 
and welfare.  There are then two additional prongs.154  First, (4a) asks if the 
abuse is of such nature that standing alone it compels the conclusion that 
reunification should not be required, e.g. conduct particularly heinous or 
abhorrent to society, involving savage, brutal, or repetitive beatings, torture, 
or sexual abuse?155 Second, (4b) is this a case of abandonment, corporal 
punishment not resulting in permanent injury, or serious neglect and mental 
abuse, etc., which may or may not support the conclusion that reuniting the 
family will place the child at risk?156  The court may consider whether to 
admit expert testimony and the conduct and its relationship to the parent-
child bond, along with an assessment of the parents’ remedial efforts as 
                                                                                                     
 151. These include Georgia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin.  See supra notes 92, 95-96, 98, 101. 
 152. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 179 N.J. 264, 274 (N.J. 
2004) (holding that aggravating circumstances eliminating the requirement of reasonable 
efforts to reunify the child with the parent embody the concept that the nature of abuse or 
neglect must be so severe that attempts at reunification would jeopardize and compromise 
the safety of the child). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
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either sufficient or insufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of future 
harm to the child.157 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, citing to A.R.G., held that aggravated 
circumstances are determined on a case-by-case basis and that it is neither 
possible nor necessary to determine the entire spectrum of aggravated 
circumstances.158  Nebraska continues to illuminate the universe of 
aggravated circumstances, which includes delaying medical attention when 
a child suffers obvious severe physical injuries; severe physical injury 
through intentional abuse; starving children; and making false medical 
reports to obtain unnecessary medical operations on children.159  Nebraska 
further relaxes aggravated circumstances’ attendant requirements, finding 
that the extent of a child’s injuries are relevant to aggravated circumstances 
determinations, even though permanent injury is not a prerequisite to a 
finding, and that abuse of any child by an adult, regardless of whether it is 
the parent’s child, calls the adult’s ability to parent into serious question.160 
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, reviving language from a pre-
ASFA case, notes that circumstantial evidence excluding every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence, although perhaps not every possible doubt or 
theoretical supposition, is sufficient to find aggravated circumstances.161  
The Supreme Court of Montana has explained the meaning of chronic 
neglect and abuse in the context of aggravating circumstances: when 
parents’ conduct amounts to recurring instances of abuse or neglect over 
time, there is a clear basis for the trial court to find chronic and severe 
neglect.162 
Notably, none of these states have statutorily defined what constitutes 
torture as it relates to child abuse.  Very few cases actually venture into a 
                                                                                                     
 157. Id. 
 158. See In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 434–35 (Neb. 2003) (explaining that the 
court had not . . . [defined] “aggravated circumstances” and scope of “but not limited to” 
under the state statute, but nevertheless concluding that aggravated circumstances are further 
determined in the context of whether reunification attempts would jeopardize and 
compromise the child’s safety).  
 159. See generally In re Ryder J., 809 N.W.2d 555 (Neb. 2012) (detailing the court’s 
previous findings of aggravated circumstances not specifically enumerated in the state 
statute). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See In re D.O., 798 So.2d 417, 422 (Miss. 2001) (citing Aldridge v. State, 398 
So.2d 1308, 1311 (Miss. 1981)) (upholding a father’s termination of parental rights where 
the mother reported the father’s sexual abuse of their three-year-old and there was strong 
medical evidence supporting the allegation). 
 162. See In re M.N., 261 P.3d 1047, 1051 (Mont. 2011) (noting that children need not 
be left to “twist in the wind” before neglect can be found to be chronic and severe). 
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definition of what constitutes torture as well.  In Illinois, however, multiple 
children appealed a lower court ruling that failed to define their emotional 
abuse as torture.163  In In re A.G., three children were forced to hold down 
their sibling while their mother beat the child into unconsciousness.  While 
the children at issue were not physically abused themselves, they submitted 
to the court that they were nevertheless tortured and subjected to emotional 
harm.  The Appellate Court referred to the dictionary definition of torture 
and determined that because the children were subject to mental anguish, 
the mother’s actions constituted torture.  In another, older case, also in 
Illinois, the Court found that a mother’s presence while her boyfriend 
poured lighter fluid and lit her two children on fire was sufficient to 
constitute torture.164  The Court held that the mother was an unfit parent 
because she did not halt the boyfriend’s abuse, allowed the children to be 
deprived of food, and stood by without taking any action during the 
boyfriend’s torturous actions.165 
C. ASFA By Any Other Name 
Of the four states with this type of statute, two do not have appellate 
jurisprudence on point.166  The Supreme Court of South Dakota has held 
that the wording of the statute not requiring reunification efforts where the 
parent has “committed a crime” is distinct from “convicted of a crime,” and 
so no conviction is required to invoke the bypass provision, only clear and 
convincing evidence of the conduct.167 
Delaware’s jurisprudence, all at the Family Court level (except the 
affirmation of a recent Family Court decision by the Delaware Supreme 
Court),168 mostly deals with the ASFA-type provisions in the context of 
who decides whether or not reunification efforts are required.  In addition to 
cases cited previously in Part II, some earlier cases held that the 
                                                                                                     
 163. See In re A.G., 325 Ill. App. 3d 429, 430 (3rd Div. 2001) (reversing a holding that 
did not consider nonphysical torture and remanding with directions to find whether there 
was mental torture of three minors). 
 164. See In Interest of Lakita B., 697 N.E. 2d 830, 832 (1998) (holding that the statute 
allows removal of the child from the parents’ custody if the parent is found to be either unfit, 
unwilling, or unable to care for the child). 
 165. See id. 
 166. Alaska and Maryland.  
 167. See In re E.L. & R.L., 707 N.W.2d 841, 846 (2005) (relating that aggravated 
circumstances were apparent from the infant’s life-threatening injuries, caused by shaking). 
  168. DFS. v. A.L., No. 11–08–09TN, 2012 WL 4861426, at 21 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2012), 
aff’d Long v. DFS, 2012 WL 6525082 (Del. 2013, decided Dec. 13, 2012). 
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Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families was the 
“sole arbiter” of the decision whether to provide reunification efforts once 
the Court determined that the parent had violated a termination of parental 
rights ground under DEL. CODE. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(4).169  Other Family 
Court judges have agreed, with the caveat that the decision is subject to 
Family Court review for arbitrariness or capriciousness.170  In Jill’s case, as 
highlighted above, the Family Court determined that DFS did not act in an 
arbitrary or capricious fashion in determining that it could be excused from 
making reasonable efforts to reunify the family pursuant to DEL. CODE. tit. 
13, § 1103(d) on the grounds of serious unexplained injury.171 
Inconsistencies exist at the trial level, however, as other judges have 
stated in dicta that the court in the first instance, not in review of social 
services, is required to determine whether to offer or deny reasonable 
efforts.172  One trial court judge denied the Division’s motion for no 
reasonable efforts because the parent’s conduct was not an offense within 
the statute: the father vaginally penetrating his stepdaughter on three 
separate occasions.173  Delaware’s statute has since been changed from “the 
child” to “a child,” which captures cases of parent’s abusing children other 
than their own biological children.  These inconsistencies likely arise 
because of the complexity of cases, factual differences, the various rights at 
stake, and long-term consideration of whether reunification should be 
contemplated. 
D.  Undefined, Redirected, or Vague 
Of the six states with undefined or vague definitions of aggravated 
circumstances, four lack case law on point.174  The Court of Appeals of 
New York, while holding that the retroactive application of ASFA did not 
impair parents’ vested rights because the statute was remedial in nature,175 
also held that “heinous acts and utter disregard for a child’s life” by parents 
                                                                                                     
 169. See generally In re Phillips, 806 A.2d 616 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2002). See also In re 
A.M.P., 2002 WL 31445226 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 1, 2002). 
 170. See In re Div. of Family Servs. v. B.S., 2008 WL 2898228 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 3, 
2008) (holding that federal and state laws permit DFS not to plan for reunification with the 
parents).  
 171. See generally Dept. of Servs. for Children, Youth & Their Families v. A.L. & 
J.M., 11-14486 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2011).  
 172. Div. of Family Servs. v. James, 2009 WL 6328182 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 18, 2009). 
 173. Div. of Family Servs. v. C.A., 2006 WL 4546456 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 17, 2006). 
 174. Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. 
 175. But see supra note 119. 
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excused reunification services.176  Connecticut has a similarly limited 
jurisprudence. The one Supreme Court case on point, a severe injury case of 
“shaken baby syndrome” (now more accurately termed “abusive head 
trauma“), was notable for interpreting the state statute to mean that social 
services either had to show that it made reasonable efforts or that the 
parents were unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts, but 
not both.177  It appears from the case law that states without clearly defined 
aggravated circumstances struggle to articulate standards for when 
reunification services are excused, even in the most egregious cases. 
E.  ASFA-Plus: Beyond the Core Four 
Of the nine states in this subgroup, three do not have cases on point.178  
The appellate court in Tennessee has held that prenatal drug abuse by the 
mother and the provision of those drugs by the father constituted severe 
child abuse for purposes of terminating parental rights.179  Alabama’s 
appellate courts have broadly held that committing abusive acts against a 
child’s sibling are aggravated circumstances excusing reasonable efforts.180  
Michigan’s appellate courts have also held specific circumstances to be 
aggravating and excuse reasonable efforts, including:  placing a child at an 
unreasonable risk of harm by failing to take reasonable steps to intervene to 
eliminate the risk of abuse;181 a criminal conviction for battering the 
child;182 inflicting life-threatening injuries on a child during a psychotic 
                                                                                                     
 176. In re Marino S., 100 N.Y.2d 361, 763 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. 2003). Both parents 
were convicted of various crimes after the mother, in order to assist the father in concealing 
his rape of their eight year-old daughter, spent hours cleaning their apartment for evidence 
before taking the child to a hospital.  The mother insisted on a hospital 115 blocks away, 
despite the presence of several, much closer emergency rooms. 
 177. In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539 (Conn. 2009). In addition to abusive head trauma, 
resulting in substantial neurological impairment, the five-week-old child appeared to have 
been severely abused, including blunt force trauma to the head.  The mother had allowed the 
father to be alone with their child even after witnessing aggressive behavior and suspecting 
that he had been smothering their baby. 
 178. Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Wyoming. 
 179. In re Joshua E.R., 2012 WL 1691620 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2012). 
 180. C.J. v. Marion Cty. Dep’t. of Human Resources, 5 So.3d 1259 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2008) (upholding a termination of parental rights as to a newborn child removed from 
parents’ care at birth, after the parents had previously consented to a termination of parental 
rights to their two-month-old child, who suffered serious brain injuries from being violently 
shaken by the father). 
 181. In re Coleman, 2012 WL 1649092 (Mich. Ct. App. May 10, 2012). 
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break;183 and the doctrine of anticipatory neglect based on the treatment of a 
child’s other or older siblings.184 
Virginia’s appellate courts have also addressed the intersection of 
aggravated circumstances and criminal law, holding that the term “felony 
assault” in the statute means any felonious crime that results in serious 
bodily injury to a child of the parent, whether committed by act or 
omission, since the focus is on the effect on the child, not the parent’s 
intent.185  Virginia has also clarified the different evidentiary burdens for 
showing abuse or aggravated abuse.186 
Oregon’s appellate court has used statutory construction analysis to 
determine whether an instant case falls within the non-exclusive universe of 
aggravated circumstances. In Oregon, aggravated circumstances involve: 
relatively more serious types of harm or detriment to a child; require only 
circumstances and not actions or conditions of the parent; include the direct 
and indirect results of actions and condition; and are not limited to 
intentional conduct.187  Arkansas has also defined aggravated circumstances 
at the appellate level to include parents acting in concert to cause injuries to 
a child’s sibling, or failing to prevent the injuries and protect the child while 
knowing that someone was causing the injuries that resulted in the sibling’s 
death;188 extensive burns with an inconsistent and implausible 
                                                                                                     
 182. In re Kelly, 2011 WL 4424315 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2011) (finding it 
unnecessary to inquire whether the child’s injuries constituted severe physical abuse because 
the conviction for battery itself was an aggravating circumstance). 
 183. In re DeHuff, 2011 WL 2936793 (Mich. Ct. App. July 21, 2011) (rejecting the 
mother’s argument that because she was incompetent to stand trial and found not guilty by 
reason of insanity in a criminal proceeding after her parental rights were terminated, she had 
not acted intentionally in stabbing her son in the chest). Instead, the court found that the 
mother’s ability to form intent was irrelevant because the focus of the proceeding was 
protecting the child, not her criminal guilt). 
 184. In re Wilson, 2010 WL 4649088 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008). 
 185. Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t. of Social Servs., 43 Va. App. 205, 597 S.E.2d 214 
(Va. Ct. App. 2004); see also Kilby v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t. of Social Servs., 55 Va. App. 
106, 684 S.E.2d 219 (Va. Ct. App. 2009). 
 186. Richmond Dep’t. of Social Servs. v. Enriquez, 2004 WL 1555345 (Va. Ct. App. 
July 13, 2004) (explaining that a quantum of evidence insufficient to support terminating 
parental rights under an abuse standard is insufficient to support a termination under a more 
aggravated abuse standard). 
 187. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of Benton Cty. v. Risland, 183 Or.App. 293, 51 P.3d 
697 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). The court used the principle of ejusdem generis, i.e. that the 
general category will be comprised of the same characteristics as the specifically enumerated 
examples, to generate this list. 
 188. Fortenberry v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 352 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
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explanation;189 complicity in a child’s blindness and permanent brain 
damage from failing to protect an eight week old child from being shaken 
by the other parent;190 and extreme and repeatedly cruelty from knowingly 
leaving a child with an abusive boyfriend who later killed the child.191 
Case law from these states suggests that where the aggravated 
circumstances statute is more robust and broadly defined, courts will take 
their cue and extend the universe of aggravated circumstances to include 
cases of egregious behavior resulting in severe bodily injury to a child or a 
child’s sibling, even when the actual perpetrator is uncertain. 
F.  Missing in Action 
Unsurprisingly, most states that do not mention aggravated 
circumstances in their statutes do not address them in their jurisprudence.192  
Only one of these ten states touches on the topic.  Utah’s appellate court has 
held that some circumstances constitute prima facie evidence of parental 
unfitness, including sexual abuse or exploitation, injury, or death of a 
sibling or any child due to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by the 
parent.193 
VI.  Strengthening Delaware’s Aggravated Circumstances Statute  
Delaware has the opportunity to strengthen its statutory language 
regarding aggravated circumstances in two circumstances. First, Delaware 
can expand grounds for termination of parental rights. Second, Delaware 
can enable the Division of Family Services to more consistently forgo 
providing reasonable efforts at reunification where parents are the primary 
caregivers and have no plausible explanation for a child’s serious physical 
injuries.  Despite the overriding goal of children’s best interests in Family 
                                                                                                     
 189. Mason v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 251 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 2010). 
 190. Cox v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 2006 WL 3086187 (Ark. Ct. 
App. Nov. 1, 2006). 
 191. Pfeiffer v. Arkansas Dep’t. of Human Servs., 2006 WL 290512 (Ark. Ct. App. 
Feb. 8, 2006). 
 192. California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, and Ohio. 
 193. State ex rel. L.S., 2008 UT App. 398 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008). 
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Court proceedings, amending and enhancing § 1103(a)(7)-(8) would make 
the statute much more robust in protecting those interests.194 
Delaware has very little child welfare jurisprudence involving serious 
unexplained injury and torture cases. Several reasons may explain this 
dearth of jurisprudence.  First, child welfare proceedings are confidential, 
so most written decisions regarding cases of serious child abuse remain 
sealed from the public.195  Second, parents in such cases may voluntarily 
terminate their parental rights rather than inculpate themselves for the 
serious injury or abuse their child endured.196  Third, ASFA requires the 
exploration of family members for placement of dependent, neglected, and 
abused children when feasible.197  When an appropriate family member is 
identified, the child is often placed with them, either temporarily or as one 
means of achieving “permanency.”  As a result, many cases do not proceed 
to termination of parental rights on the grounds of unexplained serious 
physical injury or torture because the parents will consent to a permanent 
guardianship arrangement with a relative.198  Finally, cases involving 
serious injury or torture199 may proceed to termination of parental rights on 
other grounds, such as failure to plan, felony convictions, or 
                                                                                                     
 194. DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(7) (2009) (“The parent has subjected a child to 
torture, chronic abuse, sexual abuse, and/or life-threatening abuse.”); see also DEL. CODE tit. 
13, § 1103(a)(8) (2009) (“A child has suffered unexplained serious physical injury, near 
death or death under such circumstances as would indicate that such injuries, near death or 
death resulted from the intentional or reckless conduct or willful neglect of the parent.”). 
 195. DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 13, § 1112(a) (West 2012) (“All court records and dockets 
pertaining to any termination [of parental rights] shall be confidential . . . . ”). 
 196. See, e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. K.H., 10-15551 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 4, 2012). 
 197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a) (West 2012). “In order for a State to be eligible for payments 
under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which . . . . (19) provides that 
the State shall consider giving preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver 
when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all 
relevant State child protection standards . . . .”  Delaware complies with this requirement as 
embodied by DEL. CODE tit. 31, § 356 (2012), which establishes a kinship care program that 
“(a) promotes the placement of children with relatives when a child needs out-of-home 
placement, when such placement is in the best interests of the child, and when the child is 
not in the custody or care of the state.”  Delaware’s preference for family placement once a 
child is declared dependent or neglected is further implied by DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 1009 
(2012): “(b) Following an adjudication by the Court in which it declares a child to be 
dependent or neglected, the Court may . . . . (3) Grant custody of a child to any person or 
agency where satisfactory arrangements can be made but, in the event the child is placed in a 
home other than the home of a relative, the Court shall require an evaluation and report” 
from the Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families. 
 198. See, e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. A.W., File Nos. CK08-01363 & CK08-01639  
(Del. Fam. Ct. June 19, 2009). 
 199. A persistent problem with “torture.” 
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abandonment.200  Consequently, broadening the scope of omissions or 
failure to protect the child would give Family Courts more clarity as to 
when terminating parental rights is justified and reasonable reunification 
efforts are not required. 
A.  Causation vs. Omission in Child Abuse and Neglect 
Some Family Court judges may be reluctant to attribute causation to 
either primary parent caregiver when presented with a united front of denial 
regarding serious child abuse and neglect.  In such cases, the Court is 
unlikely to be able to determine which parent committed the abuse and 
which parent stood by, or whether both parents inflicted the abuse.  In one 
of the cases highlighted above, the Court determined by clear and 
convincing evidence that Jill’s injuries were caused by the intentional or 
reckless conduct or willful neglect by her parents because normal handling 
of Jill could not have caused multiple fractures, Jill did not suffer from any 
metabolic or organic disorders, and there was no history of accidental 
trauma even though the injuries occurred while in the parents’ care.201  In 
that case, the Court could not determine causation, but rather determined 
that termination of parental rights grounds were met based on a 
constellation of factors that showed the child’s injuries occurred while on 
the parent givers’ watch.202  Because neither parent would explain how the 
child sustained such severe injuries, their harmful actions or inaction, as the 
case may be, were sufficient to terminate their rights.203  Nonetheless, under 
Delaware’s current statute, without being able to find that the injuries 
resulted from a specific parent’s actions, courts may not consistently agree 
that DFS should be excused from planning with that parent or ensure that a 
seriously injured child has an appropriately quick transition to a permanent 
placement.204  Although expanding perpetration to include omission might 
raise due process issues, such an expansion would probably pass 
                                                                                                     
 200. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.B., 2006 WL 1389860 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 4, 2006); In 
re J.G.W. III, 2004 WL 3245804 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 10, 2004); Div. of Family Servs. v. 
L.M. & C.M., 2002 WL 32101227 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002); see also Div. of Family 
Servs. V. B.M. & J.K., File No. CS09-03474 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan 9, 2012). 
 201. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., 11-08-09TN, 2012 WL 4861426 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
May 23, 2012). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See e.g., Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., DE Fam. Ct., FN:12-02-10T (Jan. 8, 
2013). 
DISMANTLING THE UNITED FRONT 353 
constitutional muster.205  For example, Oklahoma allows broad protections 
for children and codified “enabling child abuse” as a crime, which includes 
permitting, i.e. authorizing or allowing, for the care of a child by an 
individual when the person permitting the care knows or reasonably should 
know that the child will be placed at risk of abuse.206  Under this statute, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld a murder conviction and death penalty sentence of 
Donald Lee Gilson under a split theory of child abuse murder.207  Oklahoma 
asserted that committing and permitting child abuse were merely different 
means by which child abuse murder could be permitted, while Gilson 
asserted that they were conceptually distinct crimes.208  The Tenth Circuit 
found that the Oklahoma Legislature clearly stated its intention to punish as 
first-degree murder either using unreasonable force or permitting the use of 
unreasonable force upon a child when the child then dies.209 
Further, the Tenth Circuit held that a unanimous jury verdict that 
Gilson committed the crime satisfied due process and that a 
“constitutionally unanimous verdict is required only with respect to the 
ultimate issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged 
and not with respect to alternative means by which the crime was 
committed.”210  Gilson was denied federal habeas relief.211  Based on the 
                                                                                                     
 205. Broadening the class of perpetrators to include parents and guardians would clarify 
that the statute is concerned with protecting children from their adult caretakers, not just 
those with formal parental rights to them.  While expanding the class of perpetrators to 
include de facto parents, primary caretakers or caregivers, other responsible adults residing 
in the home, or those individuals’ paramours would provide extraordinary protection to 
children, such an expansion would probably fail.  The court cannot terminate parental rights 
to someone who has no such rights to begin with (so the provision would be moot), and the 
court might violate a parent’s due process rights if his or her parental rights were terminated 
based on the actions of another adult.  Case law from other states suggests that this may not 
be a legal barrier.  See supra notes 142-143.  However, the problem of parents allowing 
abusers access to their children can still be resolved by elaborating on the causation 
requirements of “subjected,” as discussed below. 
 206. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 843.5 (West 2012). 
 207. Gilson v. Sirmons, 520 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2008), affirming Gilson v. 
Sirmons, No. CIV-01-1311-C, 2006 WL 2320682, at 1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 9, 2006).  The jury 
was divided as to the underlying theory of the crime, but unanimously found Gilson guilty of 
child abuse murder and permitting child abuse murder.  The State had alleged two theories 
of the crime, either that Gilson was directly responsible for willfully or maliciously injuring, 
torturing, maiming, or using unreasonable force upon eight year old Shane, or that he 
knowingly permitted Coffman, Shane’s mother, to do so.  Id. at 1203. 
 208. Id. at 1208. 
 209. Id. at 1209. 
 210. Id. at 1210. 
 211. Id. at 1212. 
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Tenth Circuit’s reading of legislative intent with respect to causation in a 
criminal statute, a similar civil statute that does not distinguish between 
permitting and committing child abuse might also withstand a due process 
challenge.212  Civil statutes that treat permitting and committing such abuse 
identically have already been enacted in Arizona,213 Virginia,214 and 
Florida.215  Terminations of parental rights based on similar reasoning of 
parental inaction or failure to protect have also withstood appellate review 
in New York216 and Connecticut.217  These developments further support 
the constitutional validity of a similar statute in Delaware. 
B.  Define What It Means to “Subject” A Child To Abuse/Neglect. 
In addition, case law from other states suggests that the statutory term 
“subjected” includes acts of omission or commission and sometimes 
exposure to conditions or failure to protect children from those conditions 
or perpetrators.218  Rather than relying on judicial interpretation, however, 
the Delaware statute could define what constitutes “subjecting a child to a 
condition or circumstance.”  Such language might include either an express 
definition of “subjected” or an enumerated list of other verbs in addition to 
“subjected to.” Such a definition could include “has exposed, caused, 
enabled, allowed, or permitted” and so forth, thus expanding the types of 
affirmative conduct or omissions that satisfy the causal element. Including 
wording such as “exposed, enabled, or allowed” would also permit courts to 
terminate parental rights in cases where the parent was not the actual 
perpetrator, but rather failed to protect the child from the perpetrator.   
                                                                                                     
 212. Criminal courts have reasoned similarly.  See supra note 131. 
 213. See supra note 85.  Aggravated circumstances exist where the child has suffered 
severe physical or emotional injury by the parent or a person known to the parent. 
 214. See supra note 121.  Aggravated circumstances include failure to protect the child 
from torture, chronic or severe abuse, or chronic and severe sexual abuse, if the conduct or 
failure to protect demonstrates a wanton or depraved indifference to human life or results in 
the death or serious bodily injury of the child. 
 215. See supra note 125. Having the capability and opportunity to prevent and 
knowingly failing to prevent egregious conduct threatening the life, safety, or physical, 
mental, or emotional health of the child is a circumstance excusing reasonable efforts. 
 216. See supra note 176.  Mother’s parental rights were terminated after she aided 
father in concealing his rape of their eight year-old daughter. 
 217. See supra note 177.  Mother’s parental rights were terminated after she left the 
father alone with their child even after witnessing aggressive behavior and suspecting he had 
been smothering their child. 
 218. See supra note 151. 
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For example, in Jill’s case, the court concluded that although it could 
not determine which of the parents abused baby Jill, it nevertheless found 
clear and convincing evidence that the parents “were her caretakers during 
the relevant time frames and other explanations provided by the parents 
were not credible nor the product of sound logic.”219  But, in Matt’s case, 
the court did not find such that the baby’s injuries were the direct result of 
the mother’s action or willful neglect by clear and convincing evidence.220  
Alternatively, Oregon jurisprudence has determined that abuse includes the 
direct and indirect actions and conditions of a parent caregiver, without 
limit to intentional conduct.221  In addition, because case law in other 
jurisdictions strongly supports a finding of aggravated circumstances for 
conduct that includes where a parent exposed, enabled, or allowed a child to 
endure abuse or torture, such a statutory revision will likely pass 
constitutional muster in Delaware.  Therefore, adding the term “subjected” 
to Delaware’s aggravated circumstances statute would provide both 
uniformity and clarity for the Delaware Family Court to find aggravated 
circumstances exist when parents fail to protect or enable abuse to occur. 
C.  Simplify the statute  
Under Delaware’s statute, a child must have “suffered unexplained 
serious physical injury, death, or near death under such circumstances as 
would indicate that the injuries, near death or death resulted from the 
intentional or reckless conduct or wilful [sic] neglect of the parent.”222  This 
causation requirement may be problematic in cases where two or more 
primary caregivers are the presumptive perpetrators of abuse or neglect 
resulting in serious bodily injury, but no one caregiver is identified as the 
actual perpetrator. 
This problem invites comparison to Summers v. Tice.223  In some ways, 
such abuse may be “over-determined” when the pool of possible 
perpetrators is very small, such as two co-primary caregivers, and one or 
                                                                                                     
 219. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.L., No. 11-08-09TN, 2012 WL 4861426, at 15 (Del. 
Fam. Ct. May 23, 2012). 
 220. See Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 10, 2011). 
 221. See ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of Benton City v. Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
 222. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(8) (2009). 
 223. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (holding that under the 
circumstances presented each defendant is liable for the whole damage, whether they are 
deemed to be acting in concert or not). 
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both must have been the perpetrator, but it is not possible to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence or any higher evidentiary standard which 
person(s) actually committed the abuse.  While criminal guilt cannot be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in such circumstances, the civil tort 
system has resolved the Summers v. Tice problem by holding both parties 
liable.  However, in Family Court proceedings, where the issue is not 
monetary damages but rather the fundamental right to parent, proceeding to 
termination of parental rights using this strict rule may raise due process 
issues.  Perhaps, where the issue is just the states’ obligation or excusal 
from case planning or providing reunification services, due process may not 
be implicated.224  This suggests that where there is a Summers v. Tice 
causation problem, the state may be equally excused from planning with the 
possible perpetrators, even in the absence of statutory language regarding 
abuse by omission or willful blindness. 
Take for example Matt’s case.  There, the court225 determined that 
Matt was abused,226 neglected227 and dependent.228  Notwithstanding the 
court’s findings based upon uncontroverted evidence that Matt was 
seriously injured, and that the mother was a primary caregiver, the court 
would not excuse DFS from case planning.229  The court, although deeply 
troubled by the facts of the case, felt constrained by the wording of the 
serious unexplained injury statute because it could not determine whether 
mother actually caused Matt’s injuries or whether Matt’s injuries resulted 
from her intentional or reckless conduct or willful neglect.230 
In contrast, a Delaware Family Court judge wrestled with whether 
DFS could be excused from case planning for reunification when two 
primary caregivers failed to provide a plausible explanation for life-
threatening injuries to their nine week-old baby.  Kate’s231 injuries included 
                                                                                                     
 224. See In re K.R., No. 99-2009, 2000 WL 854325 (Iowa Ct. App. June 28, 2000) 
(determining the statutory directive to employ reasonable services, absent aggravated 
circumstances, does not give rise to a constitutional right; parents have a fundamental liberty 
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children, but state-sponsored efforts at 
reunification are not constitutionally mandated); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 
363 (1992). 
 225. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 15, 2011). 
 226. tit. 10, § 901(1) (2012); tit. 16, § 902(1) (2012). 
 227. tit. 10, § 901 (18) (2012). 
 228. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901 (8) (2012). 
 229. Div. of Family Servs. v. A.A., 11-22215 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 15, 2011). 
 230. Id. Note, although the court acknowledged that Matt’s injuries were indeed very 
troubling, there were other factors in play that caused the Court to determine DFS could not 
be excused from case planning with mother. 
 231. The child has been given a pseudonym to protect her identity. 
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thirty-three fractures in various stages of healing and the letters “F” and 
“U” carved into her left side.232  The evidence showed that the parents were 
Kate’s primary caregivers, and they kept the door closed in the room they 
shared with her ninety percent of the time.233  One week prior to Kate’s 
long-term hospital admission, the parents took her to the hospital with a 
possible spider bite on her back.  At the emergency room, a physician’s 
assistant determined that the baby had “a soft tissue growth to the back” 
and recommended follow-up with Kate's pediatrician. Seven days later, 
Kate was hospitalized with life-threatening injuries. Baby Kate had 
extensive fractures and numerous other injuries, including fractured 
extremities, at least twelve acute rib fractures, pulmonary contusion, pleural 
effusion, bruising and swelling to various body parts, and other injuries.234 
The pediatric child abuse expert diagnosed Kate with child physical abuse 
and a life threatening chest injury.  The doctors determined that the lump on 
her back diagnosed during the first emergency room visit was actually bone 
fragments sticking out from rib fractures.  In the intervening period between 
the two hospital visits, the parents disregarded the emergency room 
instructions and failed to follow up with the pediatrician.235 
Although the Court was convinced that one or both caregivers 
perpetrated the abuse, it could not make a legal finding of “abuse”236 
because it was unable to determine who actually inflicted the “horrendous 
injuries.”237  The Court, deeply disturbed by the extent and severity of the 
baby’s injuries, was nonetheless constrained by the language of Delaware’s 
torture/chronic abuse statute because its current form suggests a causation 
element.  Consequently, the Court could not find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the parents had subjected the child to torture, chronic abuse, 
and life threatening abuse pursuant to § 1103 (a)(7).238  The statutory 
changes we propose here, adding “subjected to” (with the definition), would 
address causation (or the lack thereof) in cases of abuse or torture and 
would circumvent the problem that courts faced in these cases where the 
judge was unable to reconcile the egregious facts with the law requiring 
some form of conduct by the parent.  Our recommended statutory change to 
                                                                                                     
 232. Div. of Family Servs. v. K.H.,  10-15551 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 4, 2012). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(1) (2012); tit. 16, § 902(1) (2012). 
 237. Div. of Family Servs. v. K.H., 10-15551 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 4, 2012). 
 238. Id. 
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Title 13 §1103 (a)(7) defining “subjected to” to include enabling or 
allowing such treatment of a child would provide the Court with the 
necessary language to find that the parent subjected the child to torture and 
chronic abuse in the cases discussed above without the element of causation 
when caregivers act as a united front.239 
Other states have resolved this causation issue as it relates to being 
excused from reasonable efforts and termination of parental rights.  In cases 
of egregious abuse where one parent is more suspect than the other, willful 
blindness will not preserve parental rights240 without specifically finding 
which parents inflicted injuries.241 
In contrast to Delaware, other state courts have determined that 
parental inaction may be tantamount to perpetration of child abuse in 
unexplained serious injury cases.  For example, in a case strikingly similar 
to baby Jill’s case highlighted above, a seven-month-old baby from Rhode 
Island, Chester, entered child protective services custody for fractures in 
various stages of healing on six ribs, his tibia, ulna, and radius bones as 
well as severe abdominal trauma.242  Chester’s parents testified and 
repeatedly reiterated that they did not inflict and had no idea what caused 
Chester's extensive injuries.243  The court rejected the mother’s argument 
that the statute, which included “conduct toward any child of a cruel or 
abusive nature” as a ground to terminate parental rights, required proof of 
an affirmative act.244  Rather, the Court found “the quantum and obscene 
nature of the abuse . . . was so overwhelming that the trial justice could not 
ignore the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the information.”245 
Specifically, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that “the state is not 
                                                                                                     
 239. Id. However, the Court in that case nevertheless excused DFS from case planning 
or reunification because it determined that the child suffered unexplained serious physical 
injury at the hands of the parents pursuant to §1103 (a)(8).  It is important to note that the 
parents later voluntarily consented to terminate their parental rights. 
 240. P.I. v. Dep’t. of Children & Families, 14 So.3d 1173, 1147 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding that even a parent who is not present or who does not personally participate in 
abuse, but who knowingly fails to protect his or her child from egregious abuse, may have 
his or her parental rights terminated).  For a pre-ASFA case, see In re M.M., 906 P.2d 675 
(Mont. 1995) (interpreting the phrase “allows to be committed sexual abuse or exploitation” 
in the statute setting forth termination of parental rights criteria as not requiring actual 
knowledge by the parent that acts had been committed on the child). 
 241. See string citations supra p. 17. 
 242. See In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 773-75 (R.I. 2000). 
 243. Id. at 775. 
 244. Id. at 777. 
 245. Id. at 778. 
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required to prove which parent actually inflicted the abuse” on an infant 
with unexplained injuries in a termination of parental rights case.246  The 
Court further held that “[a]llowing parents to ignore or stand by while such 
abuse and neglect occurs is tantamount to the parents inflicting the abuse 
themselves.”247 
Similarly, in Nicole B., the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found 
parents’ contention that their toddler Nicole had inflicted multiple skull 
fractures, brain contusions, fractured ribs, and a broken leg on her two-
month-old sister “incredible, lame and implausible.”248  Until the parents 
provided an explanation of the injuries, no treatment could be offered, and 
without treatment, the children could not be returned home.249  Since further 
treatment would not elicit admissions from the parents, the termination of 
parental rights was upheld.250 
The Supreme Court of West Virginia has taken a similar stand in cases 
where parents are stalwart in their refusal to explain injuries. In State v. 
Jessica M., seven-week-old Angela died from blunt force head trauma and 
neither parent offered any medically plausible explanation for her death and 
other multiple injuries.251  Even after the suicide of father, who was 
presumed to be the abuser based on the surviving children’s testimony, the 
court would not return them to the mother.252  The court further held that 
parental rights can be terminated when clear and convincing evidence 
shows an infant suffered extensive physical abuse while in the custody of 
his or her parents, and the conditions of the abuse cannot with any 
reasonable likelihood be corrected because the perpetrator has not been 
identified and the parents have taken no action to identify the abuser.253 
Other states are also willing to accept circumstantial evidence as proof 
of abuse in unexplained infant injury with two primary caretakers 
presenting a united front of denial or ignorance as to the baby's injuries.  A 
                                                                                                     
 246. Chester J., 754 A.2d at 778. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See In re Nichole B., 703 A.2d 612, 615 (R.I. 1997) (holding it was unnecessary 
for the Department of Children Youth and Families make ”reasonable efforts” to reunite the 
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 249. Id. at 618. 
 250. Id. at 619. 
 251. See State v. Jessica M., 445 S.E.2d 243, 249 (W.Va. 1994) (“The father argued 
that he should be held blameless for his non-action, even though he supported his wife’s 
explanation….”).   
 252. The Court remanded for further fact-finding on other grounds.  Id. 
 253. Id. at 249. 
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Nebraska Appeals Court held that a finding of abuse or neglect may be 
supported where the record shows both (1) a parent’s control over the child 
during the period when the abuse or neglect occurred and (2) multiple 
injuries or other serious impairment of health which ordinarily would not 
occur. In Chloe L., six-week-old Ethan had 29 fractures throughout his 
body in various stages of healing.254  There, the court affirmed the 
termination of parental rights of both parents as to both siblings, 
notwithstanding that the mother had taken Ethan to the hospital.255  Medical 
testimony showed that the injuries were from non-accidental trauma that 
would not have happened during the normal handling of an infant and that 
could not have been caused by the infant’s toddler sister Chloe, as the 
parents suggested.256 
Similarly, a Massachusetts Appeals Court terminated parental rights 
by clear and convincing evidence for successive injuries to a non-
ambulatory infant, parents’ changing stories, parents’ failure to appreciate 
the nature and seriousness of the injuries, and ruling out of accidental 
injury.257 
Finally, a New Jersey Appeals Court determined that when a limited 
number of parents have access to an infant during a period when abuse 
concededly occurs, the burden shifts to those persons to come forward and 
provide evidence to establish their non-culpability for that abuse.258  In 
A.C., one-month old T.W. sustained a bilateral skull fracture while in the 
exclusive care of his mother and neither parent accepted responsibility nor 
explained the trauma.259  The A.C. court reasoned that the difficulty of 
obtaining direct evidence of parental abuse in closed environments with 
victims who have a limited ability to inculpate their abusers justified 
shifting the burden to a closed set of caretakers when unexplained injuries 
occur.260  The court further concluded that “[t]he abused child's interest is 
                                                                                                     
 254. See In re Interest of Chloe L., 712 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (holding 
that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest due to neglect because 
the parents had committed a felony assault that resulted in serious bodily injury to Ethan). 
 255. Id. at 292, 298. 
 256. Id. at 293. 
 257. See In re Adoption of Nelson, 756 N.E.2d 1227, at 2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) 
(unpublished table decision) (affirming the decision that dispensed consent of the father and 
mother). 
 258. See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.C., 911 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006) (holding that the child was neglected). 
 259. Id. at 105, 111. 
 260. Id. at 111. 
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paramount; only when the child can be protected within the family will the 
parents' interest in the care and custody of their child also be realized.”261 
The common denominator in all of those cases was a seriously injured 
child with parents presenting a united front of denial or ignorance.262  None 
of those jurisdictions required actual proof or a criminal conviction of the 
perpetrator of each child’s horrific injuries.263  Instead, those courts 
resolved that it was the parents’ highest duty to keep their child safe.264  
Because the child was seriously injured on the parents' watch and the 
parents could not explain how the child sustained such deplorable injuries, 
these courts terminated parental rights.265 
This clause notably focuses on the resultant harm to the child without 
identifying a particular perpetrator.  While this focus on the child’s injury 
rather than parent’s conduct protects children in cases of undetermined 
causation, the use of the term “suffered” instead of “subjected to” invites 
potentially a different reading of causation in § 1103(a)(8) than in § 
1103(a)(7).  Therefore, we recommend merging (a)(7) and (a)(8) into one 
aggravated circumstances statute that incorporates what acts or omissions 
subjected a child to abuse/neglect: 1103(a)(7) Any child has been subjected 
to torture, chronic abuse, chronic or severe neglect, sexual abuse, life-
threatening injuries, unexplained serious physical injury, near death or 
death.  Such language will refocus Delaware’s statute under the ASFA’s 
requirement to hold the child’s safety as the paramount concern.266 
D.  Adding Chronic or Severe Neglect 
“Chronic or severe neglect” should also be included under Delaware’s 
aggravated circumstances statute given its current omission from the statute 
and the difficulty of subsuming chronic or severe neglect into the currently 
listed categories. Adding “chronic or severe neglect” will have clear 
advantages to protect children in dangerous situations.  Although “chronic 
or severe neglect” would be a legal finding under the statute, a pediatric 
child abuse expert may make a medical finding of “chronic neglect.” 
Crossing over from a medical finding to a legal finding is a much more 
                                                                                                     
 261. Id. at 109. 
 262. See string citations supra p. 24. 
 263. See, e.g., In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772 (R.I. 2000).   
 264. See, e.g., New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.C., 911 A.2d 104 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006). 
 265. See e.g.,id.; see, e.g., State v. Jessica M., 445 S.E.2d 243 (W. Va 1994). 
 266. See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2010). 
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streamlined conclusion than, say, arguing for a finding of “torture” which is 
left undefined. Because there have been no published Delaware court 
decisions concluding a parent either directly tortured a child or tortured a 
child by failing to act or purposely depriving the child of basic necessities, 
expanding the statute to include chronic or severe neglect will help capture 
such horrific cases. 
For example, recently in Delaware, a twelve year-old child came into 
care following three months of isolation in his room, food deprivation, and 
other significant maltreatment.267  He was hospitalized with malnutrition 
and had some significant bruising all over his body.  While the physical 
injuries and malnourishment may or may not constitute torture, such 
treatment by the parent would likely constitute chronic or severe neglect. 
However, without adding “chronic or severe neglect” to (a)(7), such a child 
welfare case may not be covered by the existing statute since the injuries 
have a clear explanation by a verbal child and there may be no findings of 
torture or chronic abuse depending on the facts available in the civil 
proceeding.268  Equally, the term torture is so politically charged that some 
judges may avoid making such a finding.269  In addition, “torture” is not a 
medical finding, but chronic neglect is.  Therefore, enhancing the statute 
with the term “chronic or severe neglect” would enable DFS to deny case 
planning with parents in such cases of horrific child maltreatment and move 
toward termination of parental rights.  It would also likely capture extreme 
cases of failure to thrive due to chronic abuse or neglect,270 long-term 
                                                                                                     
 267. Police: Boy Locked in Room 3 Months: Couple Charged, 2012 WLNR 25484760 
(Wilmington, De) (Nov. 30, 2012); see also Michael Walsh, Delaware boy, 12, escapes after 
parents locked him in room for 3 months without regular food or medical care: police, 
NYDAILYNEWS.COM, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/parents-locked-boy-12-
room-3-months-article-1.1295254 (Mar. 21, 2013). 
 268. In that case, because criminal charges were pending, some witnesses were 
prevented from testifying in order to avoid compromising the criminal investigation.   
 269. Just as “unexplained” may represent a legal conclusion, or lack of legal 
conclusion, in the context of serious injurious, “torture” has also taken on the tone of a legal 
conclusion that may discourage judges from making a finding based on facts alone. 
 270. See Jacks v. Div. of Family Servs. & Office of the Child Advocate, 974 A.2d 100 
(Del. 2009).  Jacks’ three children were removed after continuous reports of neglect and 
possible abuse.  Id. at 104.  One child was hospitalized due to weight loss and to determine 
the cause of her failure to thrive.  Id. at 102.  Once hospitalized, the child steadily gained 
weight for eight days, suggesting to the pediatrician that the child was underfed, not failure 
to thrive.  Id.  Once placed in foster care, all three children – previously diagnosed as 
failuring to thrive – rapidly gained weight and improved developmentally.  Id.  From 2000-
2008, the children were twice removed from their mother’s home, placed in foster care, 
returned to relatives, given back to their mother by those relatives, and removed again by 
DFS.  Id.at 104.  Each time the children returned to their mother’s care, they lost weight and 
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deprivation, and maltreatment. Additionally, it would likely pass 
constitutional muster as an aggravated circumstance because South 
Dakota,271 Montana,272 and Maryland273 protect children based on chronic 
or severe neglect. 
E.  Anticipating Unintended Consequences 
As with any statute, greater complexity and/or enumeration of factors 
for consideration may lead to unintended consequences.  Any revisions to 
these grounds for terminating parental rights must consider existing case 
law on parents’ due process rights, the institutional and administrative 
capacities of the court system and the Division of Family Services, and 
children’s best interests in permanent, appropriate placements. 
In the interest of simplicity and clarity, the recommended proposed 
statutory changes to include: 
DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1101 
Definition: “Subjected,” which should be defined to include: “has 
exposed, caused, enabled, allowed or permitted.”  With such a 
definition, the proposed statutory changes would appear as follows: 
DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1103(a)(7) should read: 
(7) Any child has been subjected to torture, chronic abuse, chronic 
neglect, sexual abuse, life-threatening injuries, unexplained serious 
physical injury, near death or death. 
VII.  Conclusion 
Most states struggle with both statutory and judicial definitions of 
aggravated circumstances, especially in the context of serious bodily injury, 
torture cases, and the requirement of reasonable reunification efforts. While 
                                                                                                     
missed school.  Upon return to foster care, they gained seven to twelve pounds.  Id.  During 
these eight years, the children were not only repeatedly underfed, abused, and neglected, but 
also deprived of permanency.  Id. at 105.  Jacks’ parental rights were not terminated until 
2008 and her appeal was not settled (upholding termination of parental rights) until May 
2009.  Id. at 107.  A different statute may have enabled greater safety and permanency for 
these children much earlier in their young lives, as opposed to being left to “twist in the 
wind.”  See supra note 132. 
 271. S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 268A 21.1 (West 2012). 
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ASFA theoretically has provided a national framework for handling such 
cases, states diverge widely in their adoption and enforcement of those 
federal provisions. 
Matt, Jill, Kate, and countless other cases of seriously physically 
abused children underscore the need for Delaware to place greater emphasis 
on child welfare protections when two parent caregivers provide no 
plausible explanation for serious physical injuries and less on who actually 
inflicted the injuries.  An over-reliance on proving causation of a child’s 
injuries is detrimental to both children and the court system charged with 
protecting the child’s best interest.  Consequently, the civil system must 
address child protection without necessarily waiting for criminal 
prosecution or proof as to which caregiver injured the child. 
There are clear advantages to bolstering protections for abused and 
neglected children in the civil system when serious unexplained injury 
cases are concerned.274  The burden of proof is less stringent in the civil 
system:  clear and convincing evidence is the standard under a termination 
of parental rights proceeding, whereas beyond a reasonable doubt is the 
legal standard in a criminal case.  The effects are longer lasting: a 
termination of parental rights will likely last for the child’s minority, 
whereas in the criminal system, sentencing, parole, and probation all factor 
into when parents can have contact with their children again.  Criminal 
proceedings are punitive, whereas civil child welfare proceedings address 
the best interest of the child.275  While the criminal system can drag out 
court dates based on a variety of factors, child welfare cases must move 
more rapidly to ensure the best interest of children to achieve permanency 
within twelve to fifteen months of entering care.276 
Delaware’s child welfare system would have an enhanced capacity to 
protect children’s best interests in cases of unexplained serious abuse 
involving two parent caregivers acting as a united front given the 
appropriate statutory reform, precedent-setting case litigation, and child-
focused advocacy. 
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